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Abstract
In many decisions under uncertainty, there are technological constraints on both
the acts an agent can perform and the events she can observe. To model this, we
assume that the set S of possible states of the world and the set X of possible
outcomes each have a topological structure. The only feasible acts are continuous
functions from S to X , and the only observable events are regular open subsets
of S. In this environment, we axiomatically characterize a Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) representation of preferences over acts, involving a continuous utility
function on X (unique up to positive affine transformations), and a unique probability
measure on a Boolean algebra B of regular open subsets of S. With additional
topological hypotheses, we obtain a unique Borel probability measure on S, along
with an auxiliary apparatus called a liminal structure, which describes the agent’s
informational constraints. We also obtain SEU representations involving subjective
state spaces, such as the Stone-Cˇech compactification of S and the Stone space of B.
Keywords: Subjective expected utility; topological space; technological feasibility;
continuous utility; regular open set; Borel measure.
JEL classification: D81.
Natura non facit saltum. —Linnaeus
1 Introduction
Economic decisions under uncertainty often face technological constraints. Consider a
farmer who must plant crops in the early spring, without knowing the meteorological
conditions for the rest of the year. The crop yields of his various planting strategies
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are thus uncertain at the moment of choice. But slight variations of the meteorological
conditions will only result in slight variations in yields. The constraints of the agricultural
technology imply that the only strategies available to the farmer are those where crop
yields depend continuously on the unpredictable meteorological conditions.
Continuity constraints manifest in many other decision problems under uncertainty;
in particular, they arise in most economic activities which depend upon natural resource
extraction, weather conditions, or any other interaction with unpredictable features of
the natural environment. They also arise in medical decisions, where the uncertainty
concerns the patient’s medical condition, and the outcome is her prognosis. Anthropogenic
climate change generates a plethora of such decision problems; there is uncertainty about
the values of many parameters in climate models, which leads to uncertainty about the
response of weather patterns (e.g. temperature, rainfall, floods, droughts) to rising CO2
concentrations. There is also uncertainty about the social and economic impact of these
weather patterns, as well as the proposed policies to reduce CO2 emissions. Finally, there
is hour-to-hour uncertainty about the electricity output of solar and wind-power facilities.
But in all these cases, the outcome varies continuously with the unknown variables.
Continuity constraints also arise in many other financial and economic decision prob-
lems. For example, the income stream arising from an individual’s investment in education
or a firm’s investment in physical capital is a continuous function of future economic con-
ditions. The value of a portfolio is a linear combination of the values of its constituent
assets. In most financial derivatives (e.g. futures, options), the payoff for both buyer and
seller is a continuous function of the price of the underlying assets. In most insurance con-
tracts, the indemnity is a continuous function of the loss. Finally, the future real value of a
savings instrument is a continuous function of future real interest rates. In these examples,
continuity restrictions can be interpreted as a kind of market incompleteness.
Feasibility considerations constrain not only the possible actions, but also the informa-
tion available to an agent. The limitations of her measurement technology may restrict the
events that an agent can observe, form beliefs about, or employ for Bayesian updating. In
particular, measurement devices are often robust, meaning that they are relatively insensi-
tive to small perturbations. This is especially common in devices which convert “analog”
to “digital” signals. For example, a digital thermometer lacks the precision needed to de-
tect small changes of temperature. Measurement devices are also approximate: the output
is often not a specific value, but a range of possible values.
The Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model is the standard paradigm to describe
decision-making under uncertainty. A key feature of the classic axiomatic foundations of
Savage (1954) is that the agent has preferences over all possible functions from states into
outcomes, and can condition on all subsets of the state space. This makes sense in deci-
sion problems where the state space has a discrete topology (e.g. bets on coin flips, urn
experiments, sports games, or Arrow-Debreu economies). One could apply the Savage ap-
proach to technologically constrained decision problems, but this would require the agent
to rank infeasible acts and condition on unobservable events; this would undermine both
the normative and the descriptive content of the preference relation, the axioms, and the
resulting SEU representation. At a normative level, an agent might feel uncomfortable
2
about formulating preferences over infeasible acts, or conditioning on unobservable events;
hence she might be reluctant to apply the Savage axioms to such preferences. These ax-
ioms are supposed to impose some “internal consistency” on preferences. But why should
preferences over feasible acts be consistent with, and sometimes even determined by, pref-
erences over infeasible acts? At a descriptive level, it is impossible by definition to observe
an agent’s preference over infeasible acts, or her preferences conditional on unobservable
events. Such acts and events might still play a role in thought experiments. But since they
are impossible to properly incentivize, one can seriously question the empirical meaning
of such preferences and their relevance to the elicitation of utility and beliefs. For these
reasons, technological constraints make it desirable to depart from the Savage framework
and restrict preferences to feasible acts and observable events.
This paper studies decision-making under uncertainty with technological constraints,
and axiomatically characterizes SEU representations of ex ante preferences in such an
environment. The consequences of the decision range over a topological space of outcomes ;
these may be crop yields, health status, production levels, income streams, or consumption
bundles. The underlying uncertainty is represented by a topological space of states of the
world ; this encodes all the meteorological, physiological, geophysical, or financial variables
on which the outcome (continuously) depends. The feasible alternatives are given by a set
of continuous functions, or acts, from the state space onto the outcome space; these could be
production plans, medical interventions, climate policies, financial portfolios, or insurance
contracts. The observable events are given by a family of open subsets of the statespace
—the regular subsets. These represent the information that can be obtained by measuring
meteorological conditions, estimating unknown climate parameters, or performing medical
tests. Furthermore, the domain of feasible acts need not contain all continuous acts, and
the observable events need not consist of all regular subsets; our framework can incorporate
further technological restrictions on acts and information. Finally, the agent’s preferences
only rank feasible acts conditional upon observable events.
Of course, we do not claim that every decision under uncertainty exhibits these sorts
of topological constraints. We only claim that some uncertain decisions exhibit such con-
straints —including some which occur frequently in practical contexts. This raises the
question: does the axiomatization of SEU depend upon ignoring these constraints? Our
main results show that it does not. But these constraints do create some technical difficul-
ties. For example, Savage’s axioms (e.g. the Sure Thing Principle) depend on the ability to
splice any two acts on any bipartition of the state space. Furthermore, Savage obtains the
subjective probability measure and utility function by restricting preferences to two-valued
acts and finitely-valued acts respectively. But both spliced acts and finitely-valued acts are
typically discontinuous, and hence inadmissible in our framework. Thus, we must depart
from Savage, and use a very different axiomatization. Furthermore, our axioms only invoke
observable events, so initially they can only yield subjective probabilities for these events.
It requires a further step to extend this to a bona fide probability measure.
Despite these obstacles, we obtain several SEU representations. In these representa-
tions, utility is a continuous function; thus, similar outcomes yield similar utility levels.
This makes our representations particularly relevant to applications in economics and fi-
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nance, which usually take continuity for granted (Gollier, 2001). Utility is is unique up to
positive affine transformations. But the representation of beliefs depends on the topology
of the state space. Our first representation (Theorem 1) is “classical”: beliefs take the
form of a probability measure (called a residual charge), and are updated via Bayes rule as
the agent acquires more information. This representation applies to any Baire state space.
Starting from a compact state space, we obtain a more informative liminal SEU represen-
tation (Theorem 2); in this case, beliefs consist not only of a Borel probability measure,
but also a liminal structure, with which the agent compensates for her informational con-
straints. These structures provide dynamically consistent, consequentialist updating rules
for the Borel probability measures that generalize the classical Bayes rule. Assuming only
a locally compact state space, we obtain compactification SEU representations (Theorems
3 and 4); here, beliefs are given by a Borel probability measure and a liminal structure on
a compactification —a “subjective” state space which can be used to model catastrophic
risks, anomalous risk preferences, and infinite-horizon intertemporal choice, inter alia.
These representations require specific assumptions on the state space topology, and
assume that the agents observation technology is minimally constrained. For a general
topological state space, or when the agent faces further informational constraints, beliefs are
described by what we call a credence, a structure like a finitely additive probability measure
on a Boolean subalgebra B of regular subsets of the state space (Theorem 9). All our other
theorems are consequences of this result. Finally, the Stonean SEU representations use the
Stone space of B, a subjective state space larger than a compactification (Theorem 10),
which admits a representation of beliefs consisting only of Borel probability measure.
The restriction of preferences to feasible acts and observable events inevitably weakens
the grasp of the SEU axioms. The resulting SEU representations are not always as restric-
tive as in Savage’s classical axiomatization. Rather, they accommodate a greater diversity
of behavior by incorporating nonclassical features like liminal structures or compactifica-
tions. These nonclassical features can have a significant impact in economic applications,
such as models of differential information, risk sharing and portfolio choice.
An agent might also confront cognitive feasibility constraints in addition to technological
feasibility constraints. The classic Savage framework contains complex acts and complex
events that are difficult for the agent to fully comprehend. Can she really formulate
meaningful preferences over such acts, or condition on such events? If so, should we really
expect such preferences to satisfy Savage’s axioms? In contrast, continuous acts and regular
events are easy to visualize and understand. Likewise, in addition to measurement errors,
an agent may be subject to cognitive errors in processing the information she receives.
Regular sets are more robust in the face of such errors, and hence, form a more reliable
basis for the agent’s mental representation of her environment. Thus, our results can also
be interpreted as describing a cognitively limited agent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces notation and
terminology. Section 3 introduces the six axioms used in all our results. Section 4 presents
our first SEU representation, which uses residual charges on Baire state spaces. Sections
5 and 6 present liminal SEU representations; Section 5 gives a liminal SEU representation
for compact state spaces, while Section 6 obtains one for locally compact state spaces, via
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their compactifications. Section 7 presents our most general SEU representation, in terms
of a credence on a Boolean subalgebra B of regular sets. Section 8 continues this level
of generality with an SEU representation using a Borel probability measure on the Stone
space of B. Section 9 reviews prior literature.
All the proofs are in the Appendices. Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 9,
which is the lynchpin result of the paper. Appendix B then derives the SEU representations
of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8, using Theorem 9. Appendix C extends the representation theorem
of Section 5 to normal Hausdorff spaces. Finally Appendix D discusses the topological
implications of some of our assumptions.
2 Basic framework
Let S and X be topological spaces. Elements of S are called states of the world and describe
the various possible resolutions of uncertainty. Elements of X are called outcomes and
represent the various possible consequences of decisions. We will assume X is connected.
Acts. Like Savage, we will suppose that the agent can choose from a menu of acts, where
each act is a function from the state space onto the outcome space. This function describes
the outcome that would result from the choice of this act at each possible state of the world.
Unlike Savage, we will assume only continuous acts are feasible.
Recall that a subset Y ⊆ X is relatively compact if its closure clos(Y) is compact.
(It follows that any continuous, real-valued function on X is bounded when restricted
to Y .) For example, if X is a metric space, then Y is relatively compact if and only
if Y is a bounded subset of X . A function α : S−→X is bounded if its image α(S) is
relatively compact in X . If X is a metric space, then this agrees with the usual definition
of “bounded”. But this definition makes sense even if X is nonmetrizable. Let C(S,X )
be the set of all continuous functions from S into X , and let Cb(S,X ) be the set of all
bounded continuous functions from S into X . Unlike Savage, we assume only bounded acts
are feasible. Meanwhile, our SEU representations will have potentially unbounded utility
functions, whereas Savage’s utility functions were bounded.
There may be additional feasibility restrictions on acts, beyond continuity and bound-
edness. Thus, we introduce an exogenously given subset A ⊆ Cb(S,X ); this is the set
of feasible acts. If technological constraints only entail continuity and boundedness, then
A = Cb(S,X ). But in general, A could be much smaller. For instance, if feasible pro-
duction plans must be infinitely differentiable, then we could define A to be the set of
all infinitely differentiable functions from S to X . However, the collection A cannot be
too small; it must be large enough to satisfy structural condition (Rch) below, and must
contain all constant acts; these represents riskless alternatives. The inclusion of such acts
in A means that we can risklessly obtain any outcome by a feasible act.
Information and conditional preferences. Most axiomatizations of SEU assume the
agent can form conditional preferences once she acquires some information about the state
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Figure 1: Regular and non-regular open subsets.
of the world. In some cases, these conditional preferences are defined implicitly through
a separability axiom, such as Savage’s P2. In other cases, the conditional preferences are
explicitly built into the model (Hammond, 1988; Ghirardato, 2002). Even in these cases,
however, we need a separability axiom such as Dynamic consistency to ensure that these
conditional preferences are “consistent” with one another.
In all cases, the separability axiom says, roughly, “An agent’s conditional preferences
once she observes an event E ⊆ S should completely ignore the behaviour of acts outside of
E .” But if S is a topological space, and acts are continuous, then this statement is somewhat
problematic, because the behaviour of an act on the boundary of E is completely determined
by its behaviour on the complement of E . Once we fix its value on the complement of E ,
a continuous act can only vary freely on the interior of E . So we can only meaningfully
define E-conditional preferences concerning the behaviour of acts on this interior. These
preferences can only compare two acts which agree on the boundary, so they are very
incomplete. Furthermore, if two events E1 and E2 have the same interior, then we must
impute to them the same conditional preferences. Finally and most problematic: if the
interior of E is empty, then E-conditional preferences on continuous acts cannot be defined.
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to suppose an agent can form conditional preferences on
arbitrary subsets of S. In real life, observations are always noisy, fallible, and imprecise.
The only part of an event E which is “robust”’ against such noise and imprecision is its
interior. If two events have the same interior, then they are “observationally indistinguishi-
ble” for the agent. In particular, if an event has an empty interior, then it is in empirically
unobservable. For example, it would be absurd to suppose that an agent could consult a
thermometer and observe the event, “The temperature is a rational number”.
This suggests that we should only consider preferences conditional on open subsets of
S. But this creates a further problem, because the open subsets of S typically do not form
a Boolean algebra: the complement of an open set is usually not open. Axiomatizations of
SEU make heavy use of partitions of the state space (e.g. Savage’s P6), and a topological
space S does not admit nontrivial open partitions unless it is disconnected. (Indeed, S
would not admit an open set version of P6 unless it was totally disconnected.)
However, there is a family of open sets which do form a Boolean algebra, albeit un-
der slightly nonstandard operations: the regular subsets. Formally, a regular subset of a
topological space S is an open subset E ⊆ S which is the interior of its own closure.1 For
example, let S = R; then (0, 1) is a regular subset, but (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2) is not. Heuristically,
1These are sometimes called “regular open” subsets.
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an open set is regular if it does not have any “pinholes” or “cracks” (Figure 1). The in-
tersection of two regular subsets is another regular subset. Given any two regular subsets
D, E ⊆ S, we define D∨E := int[clos(D∪E)] (the interior of clos(D∪E)). This is the small-
est regular set containing both D and E . For example, if S = R, then (0, 1)∨(1, 2) = (0, 2).
Meanwhile, given a regular subset D, we define ¬D to be the interior of S \ D —another
regular subset. The set R(S) of all regular subsets of S forms a Boolean algebra under
the operations ∨, ∩, and ¬ (Fremlin, 2004, Theorem 314P). We will only assume that the
agent can observe regular subsets of S when defining her conditional preferences.
Now let R ∈ R(S). A finite regular partition of R is a collection {R1, . . . ,RN} (for some
N ∈ N) of disjoint regular subsets of S such that R = R1 ∨ · · · ∨ RN . Equivalently: for
all m ∈ [1 . . . N ], the set Rm is the interior of R \
⋃
n6=mRn. This implies that
⋃N
n=1Rn
is dense in R. For instance, if S = R, then {(0, 1), (1, 2)} is a regular partition of (0, 2).
Regular partitions share some properties with the partitions used in standard Bayesian
decision theory: cells must be nonempty and represent mutually exclusive events. But
they depart from the standard model in that cells are not fully exhaustive: they only cover
“almost all” of the space. A regular partition is nonetheless observationally exhaustive: the
agent always thinks she observes some cell of the regular partition, even if the true state
lies in the space between the cells. Suppose the agent makes an observation corresponding
to the regular partition R = {R1, . . . ,RN} of S, and let s ∈ S be the true state of the
world. If s ∈ Rn, then the agent will observe Rn. But if s ∈ ∂Rn ∩ ∂Rm, then the agent
might “observe” Rn or Rm (or indeed, any other cell of R whose closure contains s).
For example, suppose S = [−1, 1], let L := [−1, 0), and let R := (0, 1]. Then, {L,R}
is a regular partition of S. If the true state is negative, then the agent will observe L,
while if it is positive, she will observe R. If the true state is zero, then she might “observe”
either L or R, even though neither event truly holds. Therefore, observing L (resp. R)
only provides the knowledge that the state is nonpositive (resp. nonnegative).
Regular partitions satisfy the aforementioned “robustness” property, because their cells
are open sets: if s ∈ Rn, then the agent will observe Rn, and a sufficiently small perturba-
tion of s will not modify this observation. By contrast, if s lies on the boundary between
two cells, then a measurement of s will not be robust. This is precisely the reason for the
“liminal structures” which appear in Sections 5 and 6; they describe how the agent copes
with the “measurement instability” of states on the boundaries of regular sets.
Regular partitions also allow the possibility of measurement errors: the observation Rn
does not mean that the true state lies in Rn, but only that it lies inside the closure of Rn.
A measurement error occurs precisely when the true state lies in ∂Rn (and thus, outside
of Rn itself), yet the agent nonetheless “observes” Rn.
There may be additional technological constraints on information, beyond mere regu-
larity. Let B be some Boolean subalgebra of R(S); we can interpret B as the algebra of
“observable events”. We will say that a regular partition {R1, . . . ,RN} of an event R ∈ B
is a B-partition if Rn ∈ B for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. In Sections 4, 5 and 6, we will assume that
all regular subsets are observable (i.e. B = R(S)). But in the most general version of our
model (Sections 7 and 8), we will suppose that the observable measurements arise from
some Boolean subalgebra B of R(S). Because of this, we will formulate all the axioms of
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Section 3 in terms of such a Boolean subalgebra. However, for the purposes of Sections 4,
5 and 6, the reader can just assume that B = R(S) while reading Section 3.
Conditional preference structures. Savage (1954) started from a preference order on
the set of unconditional acts. He then obtained conditional preferences via axiom P2 (the
Sure Thing Principle). Axiom P2 assumes that, for any two feasible acts α and β, and
any event B, the “spliced” act αBβ (which is equal to α on B and to β on the complement
B{) is also feasible. But such “spliced” acts are often discontinuous, hence, inadmissible in
our framework. So instead of defining conditional preferences implicitly via P2, we must
assume they exist explicitly. But we will only assume that these preferences can rank
feasible acts, and we only assume preferences conditional on observable events. Thus, in
terms of its primitive behavioral data, our model is not directly comparable to the Savage
(1954) theory: while Savage assumed a single preference order on the universal domain of
acts, our approach relies on a collection of preference orders on a more restrictive domain.
But compared to other conditional versions of SEU ( e.g. Ghirardato, 2002), our approach
requires less data, both in terms of the number of preference orders and their domain.
For any regular subset B ∈ B, and any act α ∈ A, let αB denote the restriction of α
to a function on B. Let A(B) := {αB; α ∈ A} be the set of acts conditional upon B. For
example, if X is compact and A = C(S,X ), and B is a retract of S, then A(B) = C(B,X ).2
For a concrete example, suppose S = RN and X = [0, 1]M (for some N,M ≥ 1), and let B
be the open unit ball in RN . If A = C(RN , [0, 1]M), then A(B) := C(B, [0, 1]M). Likewise,
if A is the set of all differentiable (resp. Lipschitz, Ho¨lder, or bounded variation) functions
from RN to [0, 1]M , then A(B) is the set of all differentiable (resp. Lipschitz, Ho¨lder, or
bounded variation) functions from B to [0, 1]M .
For all B ∈ B, let B be a preference order on A(B). We interpret B as the conditional
preferences over A(B) of an agent who has observed the event B. We will therefore refer to
the system {B}B∈B as a conditional preference structure; this will be the primitive data of
the model. Our goal is to axiomatically characterize an SEU representation for {B}B∈B.
3 Axioms
As already noted, the restriction to continuous acts means that we cannot rely on “spliced”
acts the way that Savage did. Instead, we will require the set A of feasible acts to satisfy
a “Richness” condition with respect to the conditional preference structure {B}B∈B.
The richness condition. Let B1,B2 ∈ B be disjoint regular subsets of S. For any
α1 ∈ A(B1) and α2 ∈ A(B2), say that α1 and α2 are compatible if there is some α ∈ A
with αB1 = α1 and αB2 = α2. We need A to satisfy the following condition:
(Rch) For any disjoint regular subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, and any α1 ∈ A(B1) and α2 ∈ A(B2),
there is an act β2 ∈ A(B2) which is compatible with α1, such that α2 ≈B2 β2.
2If B is not a retract of S, then not every continuous function on B extends continuously to S. So A(B)
is usually a proper subset of C(B,X ). The same holds for differentiable functions, Lipschitz functions, etc.
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Figure 2: Top row. α1 is compatible with α2. Bottom row. The richness condition.
In other words, the values of an act on a regular subset B1 do not restrict the indifference
class of that act conditional upon the disjoint regular subset B2, in spite of the continuity
requirement on feasible acts. If there is a “gap” between B1 and B2 in S, then (Rch) is
not very restrictive; often, every element of A(B2) is compatible with α1. The nontrivial
case of (Rch) is when B1 and B2 are “touching” –e.g. when B1 = ¬B2. In particular, (Rch)
provides a weak version of Savage’s act splicing: For any B ∈ B, and any α, β ∈ A, there
is some γ ∈ A that is equal to α on B and indifferent to β¬B conditional on ¬B. (Rch) is
also similar to solvability, a condition often used in axiomatizations of additive utility.
A need not contain all bounded continuous functions from S to X , as long as it satisfies
(Rch) and contains all constant acts. For example, suppose S and X are differentiable
manifolds (e.g. open subsets of Euclidean spaces RN and RM , for some N,M ≥ 1), and
let A be the set of all differentiable functions from S to C; then a conditional preference
structure on A can easily satisfy (Rch) along with our other axioms.3 Alternatively, let
S and X be metric spaces, let c ∈ (0, 1], and let A be the set of all c-Ho¨lder-continuous
functions from S to X ; then (Rch) is easily satisfied.4 Or, let S be a bounded interval in
R, let X be a path-connected metric space, and let A be the set of all continuous functions
from S into X having bounded variation; then again (Rch) is easily satisfied.5 But if S and
X are open subsets of Euclidean spaces, and A is a set of analytic functions from S to X
(e.g. polynomials), then a conditional preference structure on A cannot satisfy (Rch).6
3The same is true if A is the set of N -times differentiable functions, for any N ∈ [2 . . .∞].
4A function α : S−→X is c-Ho¨lder-continuous if there is some constant K > 0 such that d[f(s1), f(s2)] ≤
K ·d(s1, s2)c for all s1, s2 ∈ S. In the special case when c = 1, these are called Lipschitz-continuous functions.
Any continuously differentiable function is Lipschitz.
5A function α : [0, S]−→X has bounded variation if its “total variation” sup{∑Nn=1 d[α(sn), α(sn−1)];
N ∈ N and 0 ≤ s0 < s1 < · · · < sN ≤ S} is finite. Heuristically, this means that α does not oscillate too
violently; it describes a path through X of finite total length.
6An infinitely differentiable function α : S−→X is analytic if it is the limit of its own Taylor series in
a neighbourhood around each point in S. An analytic function can be completely reconstructed from its
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The ordering axiom. For the rest of this paper, we will assume that each order B in
the conditional preference structure {B}B∈B is complete (for any α, β ∈ A(B), at least
one of α B β or β B α holds), transitive (for any α, β, γ ∈ A(B), if α B β and β B γ,
then α B γ), and nontrivial (there exist α, β ∈ A(B) such that α B β).
These assumptions are more natural in our framework than in Savage’s: they only re-
quire a transitive ordering on feasible acts, not on all logically possible acts. To understand
the interplay between feasibility and transitivity, consider a case where an agent observes
event B ∈ B, and must choose between two feasible acts α and γ in A(B). Say momentar-
ily that she has preferences over unfeasible acts, and that there is an unfeasible act β such
that α B β and β B γ. A blind application of transitivity would yield α B γ. But the
unfeasibility of β undermines the meaningfulness of both rankings α B β and β B γ.
Why should these two rankings influence the choice between α and γ? By restricting
preferences to feasible acts, we eliminate such spurious influences.
The separability axioms. Additive separability over disjoint events is a characteristic
feature of SEU theories. In a Savage framework, it is captured by P2. In Ghirardato’s
(2002) axiomatization, where an agent is endowed with conditional preferences, separability
is captured by the axiom of Dynamic Consistency. Dynamic Consistency also plays a
central role in Hammond’s (1988) derivation of SEU maximization on decision trees; see
also Hammond (1998, §6-§7). Our next axiom captures separability through a version of
Dynamic Consistency that only applies to regular partitions of a regular event.
(Sep) For any event B ∈ B, any disjoint events D, E ∈ B such that D ∨ E = B, and any
α, β ∈ A(B) with αD ≈D βD, we have α B β if and only if αE E βE .
In (Sep), the “forward implication” (from α B β to αE E βE) says that a feasible act
that was deemed optimal conditional on B will be still be optimal conditional on E . The
“backward implication” says that a more-informed decision is more reliable than a less-
informed decision; thus, decisions based on inferior information should be guided by the
hypothetical decisions that would have been made with superior information. In this case,
the agent should choose α over β given inferior information (B), because she recognizes
that she would be willing to choose α given superior information (either D or E).
Just as the restriction to feasible acts strengthens the appeal of the ordering axiom,
the restriction to regular events strengthens the appeal of (Sep) —more specifically, its
“backward implication”. To see this, suppose the agent must choose between two feasible
acts α and β, conditional on some regular event B. Say that she has preferences conditional
upon nonregular (hence, unobservable) events D and E , with D∨E = B, such that αD ≈D
βD and αE E βE . A na¨ıve application of separability would then yield α B β. But D
and E are unobservable events, so it is not clear that the preferences conditional on D and
E are even meaningful, much less that they should determine the choice between α and β.
The restriction to regular events eliminates this problem.
behaviour in a tiny neighbourhood around any point in its domain. This means that an analytic function
defined on an open subset R ⊆ S has at most one extension to an analytic function on all of S.
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It is easy to see that the logical equivalence in Axiom (Sep) also holds for indifference
and for strict preference: for any α, β ∈ A(B) with αD ≈D βD, we have:
(i) α B β if and only if αE E βE ; and
(ii) α ≈B β if and only if αE ≈E βE .
Statement (i) means that no event in B is null. Thus, any SEU representation must give
nonzero probability to all events in B. Conversely, statement (ii) says that the boundary
of any event in B is null: the behaviour of α and β on that small part of B that is not
covered by D ∪ E is irrelevant for decisions conditional on B. This seems to suggest that
the SEU representation must give zero probability to the boundary of any regular set. But
A is a set of continuous functions; thus, the behaviour of α and β on the open sets D and
E entirely determines their behaviour on the common boundary ∂D∩∂E . Thus, statement
(ii) does not mean that we ignore the behaviour of α and β on ∂D∩ ∂E , as if ∂D∩ ∂E had
zero probability; it just means that we have already implicitly accounted for this behaviour
in our rankings of αD versus βD and αE versus βE . This implicit account will become
explicit with the “liminal structures” of Sections 5 and 6.
If D, E ∈ B are disjoint and B = D ∨ E , then Axiom (Sep) says that the B-ranking
of two acts α, β ∈ A(B) is partly determined by the D-ranking of αD versus βD and the
E -ranking of αE versus βE . The next axiom says that this dependency is continuous.
(PC) Let B = D∨E as in axiom (Sep). Let β, α, β ∈ A(B) be three acts with β ≺B α ≺B β.
Then there exist δ, δ ∈ A(D) and ,  ∈ A(E), with δ ≺D αD ≺D δ and  ≺E αE ≺E 
such that, for any α′ ∈ A(B), if δ ≺D α′D ≺D δ and  ≺E α′E ≺E  then β ≺B α′ ≺B β.
The intuition here is that a small variation in αD and αE (relative to the order topologies
on A(D) and A(E)) should not affect the B- ranking of α versus β and β.
Continuity of ex post preferences. For any x ∈ X , let κx be the constant x-valued
act on S. Let K := {κx; x ∈ X}. We have assumed K ⊆ A, so the preference order S ,
restricted to K, induces a preference order xp on X as follows: for any x, y ∈ X ,(
x xp y
)
⇐⇒
(
κx S κy
)
. (1)
xp describes the ex post preferences of the agent on X when there is no uncertainty. The
next axiom says that these preferences are compatible with the underlying topology on X .
(C) The ex post order xp is continuous in the topology on X . That is: for all x ∈ X , the
contour sets {y ∈ X ; y xp x} and {y ∈ X ; y xp x} are closed subsets of X .
Certainty equivalents. For any B ∈ B and x ∈ X , let κxB := (κx)B; this is the constant
x-valued act, conditional on B. Given an act α ∈ A(B), we say x is a certainty equivalent
for α on B if κxB ≈B α. The next axiom is a mild richness condition on X .
(CEq) For any event B ∈ B, any act α ∈ A(B) has a certainty equivalent on B.
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Axiom (CEq) may appear somewhat implausible. But it is a logical consequence of the
following axiom of “constant continuity” which may seem more natural.
(CC) For any event B ∈ B and any act α ∈ A(B), the sets {x ∈ X ; κxB B α} and
{x ∈ X ; α B κxB} are closed in X .
If X is connected and A ⊆ Cb(S,X ), then (CC) is equivalent to the conjunction of (C) and
(CEq). So we could state our results with a single axiom (CC) in place of (CEq) and (C).
The statewise dominance axiom. Our next axiom imposes some consistency between
the agent’s conditional preference structure and her ex post preferences. It says that the
agent always prefers a statewise dominating act.
(Dom) For any B ∈ B and any α, β ∈ A(B), if α(b) xp β(b) for all b ∈ B, then α B β.
Furthermore, if α(b) xp β(b) for all b ∈ B, then α B β.
Recall that if the agent “observes” the event B ∈ B, this does not mean the true state lies in
B —it only lies in the closure of B. But this does not problematize the first part of (Dom):
since α and β are continuous functions, they have unique extensions to the closure of B,
and these extensions preserve weak statewise dominance. Thus, weak statewise dominance
over B implies weak statewise dominance over all states that remain possible: those in the
closure of B. Of course, the extensions of α and β might not preserve strict dominance.
So the second part of (Dom) requires some sub-event of B to be non-null. But as we have
already observed, (Sep) implies that all events in B are non-null.
(Dom) appears similar to (Sep), and thus to Savage’s axiom P2. The difference is that
(Sep) applies to regular partitions, while (Dom) applies to partitions into singleton sets,
which, in general, are not regular. Thus, (Dom) cannot be obtained as a special case of
(Sep). Axiom (Dom) is also related to Savage’s axioms P3 and P7. Axiom P3 requires
the ranking of outcomes to be independent of the events that yield the outcomes. (Dom)
entails a similar form of state independence: it implies that S can be replaced by B for
any B ∈ B, in formula (1). Thus, the ex post preference orders obtained from different
conditional preference orders must agree with one other. Finally, to see how (Dom) and
P7 overlap, consider the special case of (Dom) where one of α or β is a constant act.
Tradeoff consistency. Our last axiom is a version of the Cardinal Coordinate Indepen-
dence axiom used in Wakker’s (1988) axiomatization of SEU. We need some preliminary
definitions. Let B ∈ B, and let Q := ¬B. Consider an outcome x ∈ X and an act
α ∈ A(Q). Structural condition (Rch) yields an act (xBα) ∈ A with two properties:
(B1) (xBα)B ≈B κxB, and (B2) (xBα)Q ≈Q α.
We will call (xBα) an (x, α)-bet for B; if B obtains, this bet is indifferent to the outcome
x, while it is indifferent to α conditional on the complement of B. Note that (xBα) is not
uniquely defined by (B1) and (B2). But if (xBα) and (xBα)′ are two acts satisfying (B1)
and (B2), then axiom (Sep) implies that (xBα) ≈S (xBα)′.
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Fix now four outcomes x, y, v, w ∈ X , and a regular subset B ∈ B. Let Q := ¬B. We
write (x B; y)  (v B; w) if there exist α, β ∈ A(Q), an (x, α)-bet (xBα) ∈ A, a (y, β)-bet
(yBβ) ∈ A, a (v, α)-bet (vBα) ∈ A and a (w, β)-bet (wBβ) ∈ A such that (xBα) S (yBβ)
while (vBα) S (wBβ). By the remark in the previous paragraph, this implies that for any
such bets (xBα), (yBβ), (vBα), (wBβ) ∈ A, we have (xBα) S (yBβ) and (vBα) S (wBβ).
If (xBα) S (yBβ), then the “gain” obtained by changing x to y on B is at least enough
to compensate for the “loss” incurred by changing α to β on Q. In contrast, if (vBα) S
(wBβ), then the gain obtained by changing v to w on B is at most enough to compensate
for the loss incurred by changing α to β on Q. Together, these two observations imply that
the gain obtained from changing x to y on B is at least as large as the gain from changing
v to w on B; hence the notation (x B; y)  (v B; w). If S has an SEU representation
with utility function u, then (x B; y)  (v B; w) means that u(y)− u(x) ≥ u(w)− u(v).
Conversely, we write (x B; y) ≺ (v B; w) if there exist γ, δ ∈ A(Q), an (x, γ)-bet
(xBγ) ∈ A, a (y, δ)-bet (yBδ) ∈ A, a (v, γ)-bet (vBγ) ∈ A and a (w, δ)-bet (wBδ) ∈ A
such that (xBγ) S (yBδ) while (vBγ) ≺S (wBδ). Again, this implies that (xBγ) S (yBδ)
and (vBγ) ≺S (wBδ) for any such bets (xBγ), (yBδ), (vBγ), (wBδ) ∈ A. If S had an SEU
representation, then this means that u(y)− u(x) < u(w)− u(v). Here is our final axiom:
(TC) For any two regular subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, there are no x, y, v, w ∈ X such that
(x
B1
; y)  (v B1; w) while (x B2; y) ≺ (v B2; w).
In the case B1 = B2, (TC) requires trading attitudes over outcomes to be well-defined,
independently of the acts that are used to reveal them. In the case B1 6= B2, this axiom
requires trading attitudes at different regular subsets to be consistent with each other: they
must be independent of the event over which outcomes are traded. Thus, trading attitides
can be evaluated independently from the choice situation used to reveal them.
Previous axiomatizations of SEU using a tradeoff consistency axiom (e.g. Wakker
(1988)) did not also require a separability axiom, because it was implied by tradeoff con-
sistency. But our axiom (Sep) is not superseded by (TC); to the contrary, (Sep) is necessary
to even state (TC). Axiom (TC) needs “bets”’ satisfying conditions (B1) and (B2). To
construct these bets, we use (Rch). But the resulting construction is non-unique. To show
that this non-uniqueness doesn’t matter in our formulation of (TC), we must invoke (Sep).
4 SEU representations on Baire state spaces
In this section and the next two sections, we will suppose that all regular subsets of S are
observable. Thus, the agent’s conditional preference structure takes the form {R}R∈R(S).
We will see that, with mild assumptions on the topology of the state space, the axioms
described in Section 3 yield a unique subjective expected utility representation for this
conditional preference structure. But first we need some topological preliminaries.7
7For further explanation of these and all other topological concepts in this paper, see Willard (2004)
or Engelking (1989). Other sources are Aliprantis and Border (2006, Ch.2) and Royden (1988, Ch.8).
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A subset N ⊆ S is nowhere dense if int[clos(N )] = ∅. For example, for any R ∈ R(S),
the boundary ∂R is nowhere dense in S. A subset M ⊆ S is meager if it is a countable
union of nowhere dense sets. Heuristically, meager sets are “small”. For example, the set
Q of rational numbers is meager in the space R.
A subset B ⊆ S has the Baire property if B = O4M for some open O ⊆ S and some
meager M ⊂ S. Heuristically, this means that B is “almost open” in S. Let Bai(S) be
the collection of all subsets of S with the Baire property; then Bai(S) is a Boolean algebra
under the standard set-theoretic operations. Observe that R(S) ⊆ Bai(S) as sets, but the
Boolean algebra operations are different.
A probability charge on Bai(S) is a function ν : Bai(S)−→[0, 1] such that (1) ν[S] = 1
and (2) ν[AunionsqB] = ν[A] + ν[B] for any disjoint A,B ∈ Bai(S). We say that ν is a residual
charge if, furthermore, ν[M] = 0 for any meager M ⊂ S. We say that ν has full support
if ν(R) > 0 for any nonempty regular subset R ∈ R(S). In particular, if every nonempty
open subset of S contains a nonempty regular subset (i.e. S is quasiregular), then ν has
full support if and only if ν(O) > 0 for any nonempty open subset O.
The topological space S is a Baire space if the intersection of any countable family of
open dense sets is dense. For example, any open subset of the Euclidean space RN is
a Baire space. More generally, any completely metrizable space is Baire (Willard, 2004,
Corollary 25.4).8 In particular, every topological manifold is Baire.9 Finally, any locally
compact Hausdorff space is Baire.10 Intuitively, non-Baire spaces are extremely “sparse”
or “porous”; they are unlikely to arise naturally in economic models. (For example, a
countable Hausdorff space is not Baire. Also, the product topology on Q×R is not Baire.)
Finally, S is nondegenerate if it contains a nonempty open subset which is not dense —or
equivalently, a proper closed subset with nonempty interior. This means that R(S) is not
trivial. Nondegeneracy is a very mild condition; for example, any nonsingleton Hausdorff
space is nondegenerate (Lemma B2(a)). Our first result gives an SEU representation for
conditional preference structures on any nondegenerate Baire state space.
Theorem 1 Let S be a nondegenerate Baire space, let X be a connected space, and let
A ⊆ Cb(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on A satisfying (Rch).
Then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC) if and only if there
is a residual charge ν on S with full support, and a continuous function u : X−→R such
that for any R ∈ R(S) and any α, β ∈ A(R), we have
(
α R β
)
⇐⇒
(∫
R
u ◦ α dν ≥
∫
R
u ◦ β dν
)
. (2)
Furthermore, ν is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
8A topological space is metrizable if its topology can be generated by a metric. It is completely metrizable
if this metric is complete, meaning that every Cauchy sequence converges.
9A Hausdorff space is an N -dimensional topological manifold if every point has an open neighbourhood
which is homeomorphic to RN . Thus, it is “locally Euclidean” near every point. A sphere is an example.
10 See Section 5 for the definition of “Hausdorff”, and Section 6 for the definition of “locally compact”.
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Theorem 1 yields a “classical” SEU representation, quite similar to Savage. But there
are three possible objections to this result: first, Bai(S) is not the familiar Borel sigma
algebra; second, residual charges are only finitely additive, and third, they are generally not
normal. To respond to these objections, the next section provides an SEU representation
with a normal Borel probability measure. This representation will also give an insight
into how the agent copes with her informational constraints —an insight which is lacking
in Theorem 1. Heuristically, this is because a residual charge assigns probability zero to
the boundary of any regular set, as if the agent thinks that such boundary events “never”
occur. But a better representation of the agent’s beliefs shows that she recognizes that
boundary events can occur; this is encoded in what we call a liminal structure.
5 SEU representations on compact state spaces
A topological space S is Hausdorff if any pair of points in S can be placed in two disjoint
open neighbourhoods. For example, any metrizable space (e.g. any topological manifold) is
Hausdorff. In particular, any subset of RN is Hausdorff. The space S is compact if, for any
collection O of open sets whose union is S, there is a finite subcollection {O1, . . .ON} ⊆ O
such that O1 ∪ · · · ∪ON = S. For example, any closed, bounded subset of RN is compact.
Let Bor(S) be the Borel sigma-algebra of S —that is, the smallest sigma-algebra con-
taining all open sets. Let ν be a Borel probability measure on S —that is, a (countably addi-
tive) probability measure on Bor(S). For any B ∈ Bor(S), let νB be the restriction of ν to
a Borel measure on B, and let L1(B, νB) be the Banach space of real-valued, νB-integrable
functions on B, modulo equality νB-almost everywhere. Finally, let L1(B, νB; [0, 1]) be the
set of [0, 1]-valued functions in L1(B, νB). A liminal density structure subordinate to ν is a
collection {φR}R∈R(S), where, for all R ∈ R(R), φR ∈ L1(∂R, ν∂R; [0, 1]) is a function such
that, for any regular partition {R1, . . . ,RN} of S, we have
φR1 + · · ·+ φRN = 1, ν-almost everywhere on ∂R1 ∪ · · · ∪ ∂RN . (3)
In the model we develop in this section, the agent’s “beliefs” will be represented by a
Borel probability measure ν, along with a liminal density structure {φR}R∈R(S) subordinate
to ν. Heuristically, ν describes the agent’s ex ante beliefs, while {φR}R∈R(S) describes how
she copes with her informational constraints. Recall that, when the agent “observes” a
regular event R, there is a chance that the state of the world is not in R, but instead on
its boundary ∂R. The density φR describes the agent’s beliefs about the latter possibility.
To be precise, she assigns the following conditional probability to any event B ∈ Bor(S):
ν(B ∩R) +
∫
B∩∂R
φR dν
ν(R) +
∫
∂R
φR dν
. (4)
Note that this expression may leave some conditional probability outside R. Thus, “ob-
serving” R increases the probability that R actually holds to at least ν(R)/ν[clos(R)], but
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not necessarily to certainty. However, this “spillover” probability is confined to the closure
of R; formula (4) implies that the probability of clos(R) given R always equals one. The
intuition is straightforward: because of the technological constraints on her information,
an agent observing R only knows for sure that the true state lies in clos(R).
For example, suppose the agent is about to make an observation corresponding to a
regular partition {R1, . . . ,RN}. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], her ex ante probability of “observing”
Rn is µ[Rn] := ν[Rn] +
∫
∂Rn φRn dν. Now suppose that she has observed Rn; then she
believes that the true state is really in Rn with probability ν[Rn]/µ[Rn], whereas it is on
the boundary of Rn with probability 1−(ν[Rn]/µ[Rn]). Furthermore, the density φRn tells
her where the state is likely to be on ∂Rn, given that this latter case occurs.
In particular, suppose S = [−1, 1], and consider the partition {L,R}, where L :=
[−1, 0) and R := (0, 1] . Thus, ∂L = ∂R = {0}, so that φL and φR are entirely determined
by their values at 0. Suppose that ν{0} > 0. Formula (3) says that φL(0) + φR(0) = 1.
Let µ[L] := ν(L) + φL(0) ν{0}, while µ[R] := ν(R) + φR(0) ν{0}; these are the agent’s
subjective probabilities of observing L and R. The agent believes that, if the true state
were s = 0, then she would observe the event L with probability φL(0), whereas she would
observe the event R with probability φR(0). Once she has observed L, she thinks that
actually s = 0 with probability p := φL(0) ν{0}/µ(L), whereas s < 0 with probability
1− p. On the other hand, if she has observed R, then she thinks that actually s = 0 with
probability q := φR(0) ν{0}/µ(R), whereas s > 0 with probability 1− q.
Liminal density SEU representation. Let X be another topological space, let A ⊆
Cb(S,X ), and let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on A. A liminal density
SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S) is given by a Borel probability measure ν on Bor(S) and
a liminal density structure {φR}R∈R(S) subordinate to ν, along with a continuous utility
function u : X−→R, such that, for all R ∈ R(S) and all α, β ∈ A(R),(
α R β
)
⇐⇒ (5)(∫
R
u ◦ α dν +
∫
∂R
(u ◦ α)φR dν ≥
∫
R
u ◦ β dν +
∫
∂R
(u ◦ β)φR dν
)
.
(Here we use the fact u ◦ α and u ◦ β have unique extensions to ∂R, by continuity.) Note
that the “boundary” terms in (5) do not violate consequentialism or dynamic consistency.
To see this, let α, β ∈ A. Because α, β and u are all continuous, the values of u ◦ α and
u◦β on ∂R are completely determined by their values on R. Thus, (5) satisfies consequen-
tialism: if αR = βR, then α and β must have the same expected utility, conditional on R.
Meanwhile, equation (3) ensures that the expected utility of α on S is a weighted average
of the conditional-expected utilities of α on R and on ¬R (as expressed on the right side
of (5)), and likewise for β. Thus, if the conditional-expected utility of α is greater than
that of β on both R and also on ¬R, then it must be greater on all of S, in accord with
the principle of dynamical consistency. If S = R, then (5) simplifies to(
α S β
)
⇐⇒
(∫
S
u ◦ α dν ≥
∫
S
u ◦ β dν
)
. (6)
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In other words, the unconditional preference order S always has a “classical” SEU rep-
resentation. The liminal density structure only emerges in the representation of the con-
ditional preference orders, and essentially serves in the updating of preferences and beliefs
as new information is acquired. Our second result provides a characterization of liminal
density SEU representations in terms of the axioms of Section 3.
Theorem 2 Let S be a (nonsingleton) compact Hausdorff space, let X be a connected
space, and let A ⊆ C(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on A
satisfying (Rch). Then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC) if
and only if it admits a liminal density SEU representation (5), where ν is a normal Borel
probability measure with full support. Furthermore, ν is unique, the elements of {φR}R∈R(S)
are unique (ν-almost everywhere), and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
At first glance, there appears to be a direct contradiction between the “uniqueness”
claims in Theorems 1 and 2, since both theorems could be applied to the same conditional
preference structure. But there is no contradiction: Theorem 2 is formulated in terms
of a Borel probability measure, while Theorem 1 was formulated in terms of a residual
charge. They are not the same type of representation. (Likewise, none of our later SEU
representations will contradict each other’s “uniqueness” claims.)
The liminal density SEU representation (5) might appear rather unwieldy, since it
requires the agent to carry around a liminal density structure {φR}R∈R(S), which seems
like a very complicated information structure. But the same criticism could be made of
Savage’s original SEU representation, because a finitely additive probability measure is
already a very complicated information structure. (For example, any ultrafilter defines a
finitely additive probability measure). Countably additive measures are no less complex;
we simply underestimate this complexity when we think about the (very small) set of
probability measures that admit parsimonious descriptions (e.g. uniform distributions,
normal distributions, and other parametric families). Indeed, as we have already noted,
the same conditional preference structure can admit both a liminal density representation
and a residual charge representation; thus, all of the informational complexity of the liminal
density structure {φR}R∈R(S) is already implicitly present in the residual charge in (2).
It might seem that the “boundary” integrals in the SEU representations (5) are likely to
be zero in most economic applications, where probability is typically distributed “smoothly”
over the state space. But this is not the case, for two reasons. First, the probability distri-
butions describing many economic or strategic interactions naturally concentrate around
certain values. For example, consider a principal-agent interaction, where the principal
has imperfect monitoring technology, and the agent wants to extract as much surplus as
possible without crossing a threshold which would trigger a reprisal from the principal.
Likewise, consider a regulated market, in which firms must meet or exceed threshold val-
ues of certain metrics to keep their license or to receive some desired certification. For
example, to comply with the Basel III requirements, a bank must maintain a “Common
Equity Tier 1 Ratio” of at least 4.5%, and a “Leverage Ratio” of at least 3%. It is likely
that many banks will seek to exceed these minimum thresholds by as small a margin as
possible, thereby maximizing expected profits while technically complying with the rules.
17
Similar phenomena occur in games where a player’s strategy ranges continuously over
a topological space, but other players can only observe this strategy through a regular
partition. For example, professional boxers must compete with other boxers in the same
“weight class”; in particular, the weight range is 63.5 kg - 66.7 kg for “Welterweight”
class, and 66.7 kg - 69.9 kg for “Super Welterweight”. During a fight, more weight is
better. So each boxer wants to be as close as possible to the upper weight limit for his
class. Thus, if you learn that a boxer is in the “Welterweight” class, then your conditional
probability should not be smoothly distributed over the interval [63.5, 66.7]; instead, most
of the probability should be concentrated at 66.7. On the other hand, upon learning that a
boxer is “Super Welterweight”, most of your conditional probability should be concentrated
at 69.9. A liminal structure can naturally accommodate this kind of reasoning.11
Similar examples arise in any economic interaction where an actor’s true “quality” is
an element of a continuum, but it is summarized publicly by some discrete “grade”. For
example, a complete description of the credit-worthiness of a debtor might require a huge
array of real numbers, but it is summarized by Fitch, Standard & Poor and other rating
agencies with an alphabetic code like AAA, AA-, or BB+. Likewise, the academic quality
of students, the gastronomic quality of food products, and the energy efficiency of home
appliances are summarized by letter grades like A, B+, or C-. It is likely that many
debtors, food producers, appliance manufacturers and university students will find ways
to just barely exceed the quality threshold necessary to achieve a certain grade.
Concentration of probability also occurs in natural systems without such strategic con-
siderations. For example, the theory of self-organized criticality suggests that many systems
evolve gradually but inexorably toward the boundary of a “critical” region, where a small
perturbation can trigger an arbitrarily large “crisis” (Jensen, 1998). After the crisis has
run its course, the system will find itself far from the critical boundary, and the process will
begin anew. Standard examples include mountain snow packs, tectonic fault lines, forests,
and financial markets; the resulting “crises” are, respectively, avalanches, earthquakes, for-
est fires, and financial crashes. If such a system is viewed as a stochastic process, then it
will not always be on the critical boundary (for example, shortly after a crisis), but it will
be very close to it, with high probability.
Aside from these concrete examples, there is a second, purely mathematical reason why
the “boundary” integrals in the representations (5) are unavoidable: if the space S satisfies
mild topological conditions, then the liminal density structure cannot be zero for all regular
sets (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Proposition 6.9). Thus, these boundary integrals
should not be waved away as a mere technicality or annoyance; they are an essential part
of the representation, and are both economically meaningful and mathematically inevitable.
This is important, because the liminal structure affects how an agent updates her
preferences when she observes an event. For an agent with a classical SEU representation,
Bayes rule is the unique preference-updating rule that satisfies dynamic consistency and
consequentialism (Hammond, 1998; Ghirardato, 2002). But each liminal structure provides
a distinct, dynamically consistent and consequentialist updating rule. Thus, two “rational”
agents starting with the same ex ante preferences and observing the same regular subset
11Formally, in this example, we would have S = R+, Rwelt = (63.5, 66.7), Rsuperwelt = (66.7, 69.9), etc.
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might end up with different conditional preferences.
To see the economic significance of this, consider a collection of fully insured and risk-
averse agents with a common prior probability measure. It is well-known that it is Pareto
efficient for such agents not to engage in trade. But now suppose that they all receive the
same public information in the form of a regular subset R. If their liminal structures differ
on ∂R, then they will now have different conditional preferences, so they may now want to
bet against each other. This is in sharp contrast with the predictions of the classical SEU
model, which asserts that an ex ante Pareto efficient allocation remains Pareto efficient
conditional on any event. But it is consistent with the empirical findings of Kandel and
Pearson (1995), which show “abnormally high” volumes of trade around public earnings
announcements, which they precisely attribute to differences in the way traders interpret
these public announcements.
A similar issue arises with the No-Trade Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), which
relies on the fact that, for two agents with the same utility function, any divergence in
conditional trading preferences must be due to a difference in private information. Is
this result still true in our framework? This depends on how we interpret the so-called
“Harsanyi Doctrine” or “common prior assumption”: the assumption that all agents begin
with the same unconditional beliefs (Morris, 1995). In the liminal SEU representation
(5), an agent’s “belief” has two components: a Borel measure ν, and a liminal structure.
If we interpret the Harsanyi Doctrine as saying only that all agents start with the same
ν, then the No-Trade Theorem fails, because two agents observing the same information
may still end up with different trading preferences. If we interpret the Harsanyi Doctrine
as saying that all agents start with the same ν and the same liminal structure, then the
No-Trade Theorem may survive. However, this “strong” version of the Harsanyi Doctrine
is impossible to verify ex ante in our framework: we can only observe the agent’s ex ante
preferences over continuous acts, and in the SEU representation (6), these preferences are
entirely determined by ν, independent of the liminal structure. Thus, the two agents might
initially behave as if they have the same beliefs; only after they update on some event will
the difference in their beliefs become apparent.
6 SEU representations on compactifications
A Hausdorff space S is locally compact if every point in S has a compact neighbourhood. For
example, every compact Hausdorff space is locally compact. Every topological manifold
is locally compact. In particular, any open or closed subset of RN is locally compact.
(However, the set of rational numbers is not locally compact.) Every totally bounded,
locally complete metric space is locally compact. In short: most topological spaces which
would arise naturally in economic applications are locally compact.
For any other Hausdorff space X , let CL(S,X ) be the set of all continuous functions
α : S−→X which converge to some limit “at infinity” in the following sense: there exists
x ∈ X such that, for any open neighbourhood O ⊆ X around x, there is a compact subset
K ⊆ S such that α(S \ K) ⊆ O. When it exists, this limit x is unique and denoted lim
∞
f .
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Let S be a locally compact Hausdorff space. The Alexandroff (or one-point) compact-
ification S˙ is the set S unionsq {∞} (where ∞ represents a “point at infinity”) equipped with
the smallest topology such that every open subset of S remains open in S˙, while the open
neighbourhoods of∞ are the sets S˙ \K, where K is any compact subset of S. For example,
the Alexandroff compactification of [0,∞) is [0,∞]. The Alexandroff compactification of
R is homeomorphic to a circle. The Alexandroff compactification of R2 is homeomorphic
to a sphere. In general, Alexandroff compactifications have the following properties:
(A1) S˙ is compact and Hausdorff. If S is noncompact, then S is a dense open subset of
S˙. (Otherwise, if S is already compact, then ∞ is an isolated point of S˙.)
(A2) For any Hausdorff space X , any function α ∈ CL(S,X ) has a unique extension
α˙ ∈ C(S˙,X ) defined by α˙S = α and α˙(∞) = lim∞ α.
(A3) For any R ∈ R(S), there is a unique R˙ ∈ R(S˙) such that R˙ ∩ S = R.12
Let X be a Hausdorff space. Let A ⊆ CL(S,X ), and let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional
preference structure on A. An Alexandroff SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S) is given by a
normal Borel probability measure ν˙ on Bor(S˙) and a liminal density structure {φ˙R˙}R˙∈R(S˙)
subordinate to ν˙, along with a continuous utility function u : X−→R, such that, for all
R ∈ R(S) and all α, β ∈ A(R),(
α R β
)
⇐⇒ (7)(∫
R˙
u ◦ α˙ dν˙ +
∫
∂R˙
(u ◦ α˙) · φ˙R˙ dν˙ ≥
∫
R˙
u ◦ β˙ dν˙ +
∫
∂R˙
(u ◦ β˙) · φ˙R˙ dν˙
)
.
A key difference between the SEU representations obtained so far and the Alexandroff
SEU representation lies in the unconditional preference order S . While both the residual
charge and liminal density SEU representations yield a “classical” representation of type
(6), formula (7) yields the following representation, for any α, β ∈ A:(
α S β
)
⇐⇒ (8)(∫
S
u ◦ α dν˙ + ν˙{∞} · lim
∞
(u ◦ α) ≥
∫
S
u ◦ β dν˙ + ν˙{∞} · lim
∞
(u ◦ β)
)
.
Thus, ex ante beliefs consist of two components: a Borel probability measure on S, and
an additional coefficient weighting the asymptotic utility of the acts “at infinity”.
Theorem 3 Let S be a noncompact, locally compact Hausdorff space, let X be a connected
Hausdorff space, and let A ⊆ CL(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference struc-
ture on A which satisfies condition (Rch). Then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C),
(Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC) if and only if it admits an Alexandroff SEU representation
(7), where ν˙ has full support on S˙. Furthermore, ν˙ is unique, the elements of {φ˙R˙}R˙∈R(S˙)
are unique (ν˙-almost everywhere), and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
12See Lemma 7.4(a) in Pivato and Vergopoulos (2017b).
20
The main advantage of Theorem 3 is that it applies when S is an unbounded space
like RN , whereas Theorem 2 does not. The main disadvantage of Theorem 3 is that the
conditional preference structure can only compare acts which converge “at infinity”. The
problem is that a conditional preference structure defined over a larger domain of acts
may be sensitive to the asymptotic behaviour of these acts in a way which eludes an
Alexandroff SEU representation. For example, if S = R2, then the conditional preference
structure could be sensitive in different ways to the asymptotic behaviour of acts along
different curves, like y = x2 and y = x3. Intuitively, to capture such sensitivity with an
SEU representation, we would need to introduce distinct “endpoints” for these two curves,
and then assign different probabilities to these endpoints. But no such distinct endpoints
exist in R2, or in its (spherical) Alexandroff compactification. To solve this problem, we
must add a plethora of new states to S, each acting like a distinct “point at infinity”. To
be precise, we must extend S to its Stone-Cˇech compactification.
Let S is a locally compact Hausdorff space. There is a unique compact Hausdorff space
Sˇ, called the Stone-Cˇech compactification of S, with the following properties.
(SCˇ1) S is an open, dense subset of Sˇ, and the native topology of S is the same as the
subspace topology it inherits from Sˇ.
(SCˇ2) For any compact Hausdorff space K, and any continuous function f : S−→K, there
is a unique continuous function fˇ : Sˇ−→K such that fˇS = f .
(SCˇ3) For anyR ∈ R(S), there is a unique Rˇ ∈ R(Sˇ) such that Rˇ∩S = R. Furthermore,
the mapping R(S) 3 R 7→ Rˇ ∈ R(Sˇ) is a Boolean algebra isomorphism.13
Let X be another Hausdorff space. For any α ∈ Cb(S,X ), assertion (SCˇ2) says there is a
unique function αˇ ∈ C(Sˇ,X ) such that αˇS = α. Let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ), and let {R}R∈R(S) be
a conditional preference structure on A. A Stone-Cˇech SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S)
is given by a normal Borel probability measure νˇ on Bor(Sˇ) and a liminal density structure
{φˇRˇ}Rˇ∈R(Sˇ) subordinate to νˇ, along with a continuous utility function u : X−→R, such
that, for all R ∈ R(S) and all α, β ∈ A(R),(
α R β
)
⇐⇒ (9)(∫
Rˇ
u ◦ αˇ dνˇ +
∫
∂Rˇ
(u ◦ αˇ) φˇRˇ dνˇ ≥
∫
Rˇ
u ◦ βˇ dνˇ +
∫
∂Rˇ
(u ◦ βˇ) φˇRˇ dνˇ
)
.
Similarly to formula (8), the Stone-Cˇech representation of S yields ex ante beliefs that
may assign some weight outside of S. More precisely, for any α, β ∈ A, we have(
α S β
)
⇐⇒ (10)(∫
S
u ◦ α dνˇ +
∫
Sˇ\S
u ◦ αˇ dνˇ ≥
∫
S
u ◦ β dνˇ +
∫
Sˇ\S
u ◦ βˇ dνˇ
)
.
13Property (SCˇ2) holds if S is any Tychonoff space; see e.g. Theorem 19.5 of Willard (2004) or Theorem
2.79 of Aliprantis and Border (2006). But property (SCˇ3) only holds for the somewhat smaller class of
locally compact Hausdorff spaces (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Lemma 6.4(a)).
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The set Sˇ \S is called the corona —intuitively, this is the set of “points at infinity”. These
points play an essential role in the Stone-Cˇech representation. It is straightforward to
construct examples of SEU representations where much of the probability weight lies in
the corona (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Examples 4.13 and 6.6). The next theorem
generalizes Theorem 3 by providing an SEU representation on locally compact state spaces
without requiring feasible acts to have a limit at infinity.
Theorem 4 Let S be a (nonsingleton) locally compact Hausdorff space, let X be a con-
nected Hausdorff space, and let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference
structure on A satisfying (Rch). Then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep),
(PC) and (TC) if and only if it admits a Stone-Cˇech SEU representation (9), where νˇ
has full support on Sˇ. Furthermore, νˇ is unique, the elements of {φˇRˇ}Rˇ∈R(Sˇ) are unique
(νˇ-almost everywhere), and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Theorems 3 and 4 are special cases of a large family of results. Let S be any compacti-
fication of S —that is, a compact Hausdorff space which contains S as a dense subset. Let
CS(S,X ) be the set of continuous functions in C(S,X ) which can be extended to continuous
functions in C(S,X ). (For example, let S := R. Then R := [−∞,∞] is a compactification,
and CR(R,X ) is the set of continuous functions from R to X which converge to (possibly
different) limits at ±∞.) If A ⊆ CS(S,X ), and {R}R∈R(S) is a conditional preference
structure on A which satisfies (Rch), (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC), then we
can obtain a normal Borel probability measure ν on Bor(S), a liminal density structure
{φR}R∈R(S) subordinate to ν, and a continuous utility function u : X−→R, which together
yield an SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S) analogous to representations (7) and (9).
There are generally many compactifications which will yield such a representation for
a given conditional preference structure on A. We just need S to be “large enough”
that A is contained in CS(S,X ). But if S is a locally compact Hausdorff space, then the
set of all compactifications of S is a complete lattice (Engelking, 1989, Theorems 3.5.9-11,
p.169). Thus, for any A ⊆ Cb(S,X ), there exists a unique minimal compactification S such
that A ⊆ CS(S,X ); this is the smallest compactification on which we can construct SEU
representations for conditional preference structures on A. For example, if A ⊆ CL(S,X ),
then Theorem 3 says we can use the smallest compactification of S, namely S˙. At the
opposite extreme, if A = Cb(S,X ), then we must use the largest compactification, which
is Sˇ. Other collections of feasible acts lead to other choices of compactification.
Such an enlargement of the state space through the addition of “ideal points” has
many precedents in decision theory. For example, Stinchcombe (1997) proposed such a
state space enlargement to solve certain paradoxes which arise from the failure of count-
able additivity in the Savage SEU representation. In many models of ambiguity aversion,
the agent’s beliefs are not even finitely additive. But these failures of additivity in the
original state space are sometimes consistent with finite additivity in some extended state
space (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1994). Other authors have used extended state spaces to
distinguish between objective reality and the agent’s internal representation of that reality.
For example, Lipman (1999) augments the original state space with “impossible possible
worlds” to model the agent’s lack of logical omniscience. Jaffray and Wakker (1993) and
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Mukerji (1997) introduce “two-tiered” state spaces; in the model of Jaffray and Wakker, the
agent has probabilistic beliefs about one tier and total ignorance about the other, whereas
in Mukerji’s model, one tier represents the agent’s internal epistemic state and the other
tier represents objectively payoff-relevant information. In a similar way, we could inter-
pret S as the “true” state space and S as the agent’s internal model of this space; in this
view, the extra elements of S \S would be like the “impossible possible worlds” of Lipman
(1999). But there are at least four other interesting interpretations of compactification
SEU representations, which we will now briefly describe.
Catastrophic risks. In some decisions, it is important to incorporate the risk of a
“catastrophe”: an event which has a very low probability of occuring, but which is so
extreme that the agent has difficulty even imagining it, because it is completely beyond the
scale of the events she normally considers. A catastrophe could be a major global disaster
with few or no precedents (e.g. a nuclear bombardment, a large asteroid impact, or a
Carrington-class geomagnetic storm), or some other event that we haven’t even anticipated
(an “unknown unknown”). The decision-maker cannot model such events in detail, because
they are outside of her experience or understanding. But she can approximately model them
as the asymptotic limits of events in her range of experience. The elements of S \ S can
be interpreted as such asymptotic limits; thus, νS\S (the restriction of ν to S \ S) could
represent the agent’s probabilistic beliefs about catastrophes that she can barely imagine.
There are similar models in previous literature. Chichilnisky (2000, 2009) has proposed
a model where the agent’s preferences are represented by a sum
∫
S u◦α(s) dν[s]+Φ(u◦α).
Here, the ν-integral represents subjective expected utility, while Φ is a linear functional
that encodes sensitivity to catastrophic risks. One way to represent Φ is as an integral
on the Stone-Cˇech compactification of the state space (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1997), so
there is a clear similarity between Chichilnisky’s representation and our Stone-Cˇech SEU
representation (9) (although her axioms are very different to ours).
More recently, Alon (2015) has proposed a model of unawareness based on an augmented
state space. In her model, the agent knows that the initial state space S is incomplete,
but is unable to precisely describe the missing states. So she adds a single state s0 to S;
the fact that s0 obtains means that none of the states in S obtains. Each act α on S is
extended into an act α on S = S ∪ {s0} by defining α(s0) to be the worst outcome of α
over S. Thus, s0 can again be interpreted as a “catastrophe”. However, Alon’s state space
has no topology, so s0 cannot be described in terms of a compactification.
Anomalous risk preferences and the equity premium puzzle. In the model of
catastrophe aversion above, νS\S represented the agent’s beliefs about the catastrophes
which could occur. But to have such “beliefs”, she must at least have some mental image
of what form these catastrophes could take; presumably this is what the points in S \ S
represent. But the agent might also just have some inchoate anxiety about the future;
in this case, we could interpret νS\S as a description of this anxiety, without calling it a
“belief”. In this interpretation, only νS represents the agent’s probabilistic beliefs about
possible states of the world, whereas νS\S is a sort of “psychological artifact”. Nevertheless,
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the ν-weight of S \ S may affect the agent’s apparent risk attitudes.
For example, suppose the agent has the Stone-Cˇech SEU representation (9). Suppose
outcomes are monetary (that is, X = R) and consider an act α ∈ A ⊆ Cb(S,R) with
α = w +  where w ∈ R and  is a “small” risk such that ∫Sˇ ˇ dνˇ = 0. The classical
Arrow-Pratt approximation of the risk premium for α provides the following formula
1
2
−u′′(w)
u′(w)
(
νˇ(S) ·
∫
S
2 dνˇS + νˇ(Sˇ \ S) ·
∫
Sˇ\S
ˇ2 dνˇSˇ\S
)
.
Consider now an increase in the probability νˇ(Sˇ \ S) that leaves the Bayesian updates νˇS
and νˇSˇ\S unchanged. If the agent is risk-averse and
∫
Sˇ\S ˇ
2 dνˇSˇ\S >
∫
S 
2 dνˇS , this will
increase her risk premium, in a way which appears be qualitatively similar to a change in
the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion −u′′(w)/u′(w).
The standard portfolio problem with one riskless asset and one risky asset illustrates this
point. Let pi denote the excess return of the risky asset, and suppose that its expectation
conditional on Sˇ \ S is negative. Suppose also that the agent is risk-averse and invests
a positive amount in the risky asset. Then, an increase of νˇ(Sˇ \ S) reduces the optimal
exposure to risk, thereby effectively operating as an increase in risk aversion (Gollier, 2001,
§4.4). But νˇ(Sˇ \ S) also leads to predictions that are qualitatively different from those of
risk aversion. For instance, it is well-known that an agent with classical SEU preferences
invests in the risky asset if and only if pi is positive in expectation, independently of her
level of risk-aversion (Gollier, 2001, §4.1). Thus, high levels of risk aversion cannot explain
why many agents altogether avoid risky investements. Furthermore, assuming reasonable
levels of risk aversion, most people should invest much more in risky assets than they
actually do; this is sometimes called the equity premium puzzle (Gollier, 2001, §5.2). In
contrast, an agent with Stone-Cˇech SEU representation (9) will invest a positive amount
in the risky asset if and only if νˇ(S) · ∫S pi dνˇS + νˇ(Sˇ \ S) · ∫Sˇ\S pi dνˇSˇ\S > 0. Clearly,
an increase in νˇ(Sˇ \ S) makes this condition more restrictive. Thus, a negative expected
value of pi on the corona can explain the equity premium puzzle.
Intertemporal choice. Let S = R+ or N. Then elements of S can be interpreted
as moments in time, and a function α : S−→X can be interpreted as a consumption
stream. Rather than ex ante preferences under uncertainty, a conditional preference struc-
ture {R}R∈R(S) now represents intertemporal preferences over an infinite time duration.
Such infinite durations arise in intergenerational social choice theory, where the relevant
planning horizon is the (hopefully) infinite lifetime of human civilization, rather than the
lifetime of a single agent. In this context, a classical SEU representation like (6) can be
interpreted as a discounted utility sum, where the measure ν encodes the intertemporal
discount factors. However, such discounted utility sums have been criticized as giving
insufficient weight to the extremely far future; Chichilnisky (1996) describes them as “dic-
tatorships of the present”. In contrast, a Stone-Cˇech SEU representation (9) is sensitive
to the long-term asymptotic behaviour of consumption streams; this is similar to the sus-
tainable preferences proposed by Chichilnisky (1996) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1997).
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(b) (c) (d)(a)
Figure 3: The Boolean subalgebras from Example 5. (a) A typical element of Bball(R2). (b) A typical
element of Bbox(R2). (c) A typical element of Bpoly(R2). (d) A typical element of Bsmth(R2). (Note
that in each case, the negation of the shaded set is also an element of the algebra in question.)
Vestigial uncertainty. Consider an agent with a liminal SEU representation like (5).
As we explained at the end of Section 5, when the agent “observes” an event R ∈ R(S), all
she knows for sure is that the true state lies in the closure of R. The “boundary integral”
in (5) reflects her awareness of the fallibility of her measurement technology.
But now suppose that S itself is the result of such a fallible observation. In other words,
suppose that the agent’s decision problem was originally described by some larger state
space T , a set of actsA(T ) ⊆ Cb(T ,X ), and a conditional preference structure {R}R∈R(T )
with a liminal density SEU representation like (5). Suppose S is a regular subset of T , and
at some point in the past, the agent “observed” the event S; thus, she now knows that the
true state of the world lies in the closure of S in T , which we will call S. If T is compact,
then S is also compact; thus, it is a compactification of S. Having observed S, the agent
forms conditional preferences S on A(S). If we apply the liminal SEU representation (5)
to S , then we will obtain a “compactification” SEU representation like (8) or (10), where
the “points at infinity” are just the points on the boundary of S inside T .
More generally, if R ⊆ S and R is its closure in T , then R ⊆ S, so R is also the closure
of R in S. Now, R(S) ⊆ R(T ) (see Lemma B3), so we can restrict {R}R∈R(T ) to R(S) to
obtain a new conditional preference structure {R}R∈R(S). If we take the liminal density
SEU representation (5) for {R}R∈R(T ), and restrict it to R(S), then we will obtain a
compactification SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S), like (7) or (9).
This interpretation raises a rather intriguing possibility. When we encounter the agent,
she has already observed S, so the original state space T is already gone, and we are left
only with a conditional preference structure {R}R∈R(S) on A(S). But by constructing a
compactification SEU representation like (7) or (9), it seems that we can “reconstruct” the
closure of S in T ; thus, we can learn something about the original state space T through
the traces it leaves in A, even though T was not explicitly specified in the model.
7 SEU representations via credences
This section contains our most general SEU representation result. First, we relax the
assumptions on the state space topology made in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Second, we now allow
further informational constraints on the agent, represented by two Boolean subalgebras
B ⊆ R(S) and D ⊆ R(X ). We suppose that the agent can only observe events in the
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state space which are elements of B, and she can only observe properties of outcomes which
correspond to elements of D. Such Boolean subalgebras arise from natural constraints on
the agent’s observational technology, as the next five examples show.
Example 5. In the following examples, we assume S = RN for some N ∈ N.
(a) Any open ball in RN is regular. So is the complement of any closed ball. Let Bball(RN)
be the collection of all regular subsets of RN constructed by taking joins and/or intersec-
tions of finite collections of open balls and/or the complements of their closures. Then
Bball(RN) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(RN). A typical element is shown in Figure 3(a).
This Boolean algebra describes the information available to an agent whose observational
technology allows her to check whether the true state of the world is within some specified
distance of some target state. (For example, she can check the statement, “The true state
is within distance 1.6 of the point (0, 0, 0)”.)14
(b) A subset of RN is an open box if it is a Cartesian product of open intervals. Any open
box is regular. The intersection of two open boxes is also an open box (if it is nonempty).
Let Bbox(RN) be the Boolean subalgebra of R(RN) generated by open boxes. A typical
element is shown in Figure 3(b). This Boolean algebra describes the information available
to an agent whose observational technology allows her to check whether any particular
coordinate of the true state satisfies some strict inequality. (For example, she can check
the statement, “The horizontal coordinate of the state is strictly between 1.16 and 3.24.”).15
(c) A subset H ⊆ RN is a hyperplane if there is a linear function φ : RN−→R such that
H := φ−1{r} for some r ∈ R. A regular subset R ⊆ RN is a polyhedron if there is a finite
collection H1,H2, . . . ,HN of hyperplanes such that ∂R = (H1 ∩ ∂R) ∪ · · · ∪ (HN ∩ ∂R).
(Heuristically, each of the sets Hn ∩ ∂R is one of the “faces” of the polyhedron. Note that
we do not require these polyhedra to be convex, or even connected.) Let Bpoly(RN) be the
set of regular polyhedra; then Bpoly(RN) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(RN). A typical
element is shown in Figure 3(c). This Boolean algebra describes the information available
to an agent whose observational technology allows her to check whether the state satisfies
any finite collection of strict linear inequalities.16
(d) A subset H ⊆ RN is a smooth hypersurface if there is a differentiable function φ :
RN−→R such that H := φ−1{r} for some r ∈ R, and such that dφ(h) 6= 0 for all h ∈ H.
We will say that a regular subset R ⊆ RN has a piecewise smooth boundary if there is a
finite collection H1,H2, . . . ,HN of smooth hypersurfaces such that ∂R = (H1∩∂R)∪· · ·∪
(HN ∩ ∂R). Let Bsmth(RN) be the set of regular subsets of RN with piecewise smooth
boundaries; then Bsmth(RN) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(RN). A typical element is
14This construction also works if we replace RN with any metric space. But not all open balls in a
general metric space are regular, so we must restrict our attention to the collection of regular open balls.
15This construction also works if we replace RN with any Cartesian product of linearly ordered sets,
each endowed with its order topology.
16This construction also works if we replace RN with any topological vector space. But we must then
stipulate that φ is continuous as well as linear.
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shown in Figure 3(d).17 The algebra Bsmth(RN) describes the information available to an
agent whose observational technology allows her to check whether the state satisfies any
finite collection of strict inequalities based on differentiable functions. We normally assume
that the output of any scientific instrument is a differentiable function of the true state
of the world; thus, Bsmth(RN) describes the information available through such scientific
instruments. We can also construct Boolean subalgebras of Bsmth(RN) based on more
restrictive classes of functions (e.g. polynomials).
(e) In the case N = 1, the Boolean algebras in parts (a)-(d) take a particularly simple
form. Let us say that a subset B ⊆ R is basic if B = (a1, b1) unionsq (a2, b2) unionsq · · · unionsq (aN , bN) for
some −∞ ≤ a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 < · · · < aN < bN ≤ ∞. Let Bas(R) be the set of all basic
open subsets of R. Then Bas(R) is a Boolean subalgebra of R(R), and it is easy to verify
that Bball(R) = Bbox(R) = Bpoly(R) = Bsmth(R) = Bas(R). ♦
We will say that a Boolean subalgebra B ⊆ R(S) is nontrivial if it contains a proper
regular subset of S. We will consider only nontrivial Boolean subalgebras. In particular,
all the statements in this section hold when B = R(S) and D = R(X ). So on a first
reading, the reader may assume B = R(S) and D = R(X ) for simplicity.
Comeasurability. The Boolean subalgebras B and D and the set of feasible acts A
must satisfy a natural consistency requirement. Consider a feasible act α ∈ A and a
regular subset D ∈ D. Together, they define an observation of the state, obtained by
first performing the act α, and then observing the outcome via the partition {D,¬D}
to see whether the true state s has the property that α(s) lies in D. But if such an
observation of s is feasible, then there must be a B-partition representing it. This motivates
the following requirement. A function α : S−→X is comeasurable with respect to B
and D if int (α−1 [clos(D)]) ∈ B for all D ∈ D. For example, if α is any continuous
function, then α is comeasurable with respect to R(S) and R(X ) (because the interior
of any closed set is regular). Thus, all feasible acts in Sections 4, 5 and 6 automatically
satisfied the comeasurability requirement. Let Cb(S,B;X ,D) denote the set of bounded,
(B,D)-comeasurable and continuous functions from S to X . From now on, we assume
that A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D) and that A contains all constant functions.
The measurability axiom. We will need one more axiom in addition to those which
appeared in Section 3. For any x ∈ X , the open upper contour set of x is {y ∈ X ; y xp x};
the open lower contour set of x is {y ∈ X ; y ≺xp x}. Axiom (C) already ensures that these
are open subsets of X . The next axiom goes further.
(M) All open contour sets of xp are elements of D.
The intuition here is straightforward. The agent is aware of her own ex post preferences.
So for any y ∈ X , she can discern whether y satisfies the properties “y xp x” or “y ≺xp x”
—i.e. whether y belongs to the open upper or lower contour set of x. In other words, these
open contour sets must be “observable” subsets of X . But then they must belong to D.
17This construction also works if we replace RN with any differentiable manifold.
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Beliefs. We will represent the probabilistic “beliefs” of the agent by a credence —a
structure like a finitely additive probability measure on the Boolean subalgebra B. To be
precise, a credence on B is a function µ : B−→[0, 1] such that µ[S] = 1 and such that, for
any finite collection {Bn}Nn=1 of disjoint elements of B, we have
µ
[
N∨
n=1
Bn
]
=
N∑
n=1
µ[Bn]. (11)
A credence µ behaves like an ordinary probability measure. For example, for any B ∈ B
with µ[B] > 0, we can define the conditional credence µB by setting µB[R] := µ[B∩R]/µ[B]
for all R ∈ B. Then µB also satisfies equation (11). But note an important difference
from the usual definition of a measure: additivity is defined with respect to the operation
∨, rather than ordinary union. For any regular subset B ∈ B, the number µ(B) should be
understood as the probability of observing B, rather than the probability that B actually
obtains. Since B-partitions are observationally exhaustive, additivity with respect to ∨ as
captured by equation (11) becomes a natural requirement. We say that a credence µ has
full support if µ[B] > 0 for all nonempty B ∈ B.
Example 6. (a) Let S := (0, 1), and let Bas(0, 1) be the Boolean algebra of basic open
subsets of (0, 1), as defined in Example 5(e). For any B ∈ Bas(0, 1), if B = (a, b) for some
a < b, then let µ[B] := b − a. Next, if B = B1 unionsq · · · unionsq BN for some disjoint open intervals
B1, . . . ,BN , then define µ[B] := µ[B1] + · · ·+ µ[BN ]. Then µ is a credence on Bas(0, 1).
(b) Let Bai(S) be the Boolean algebra of sets with the Baire property, and let ν :
Bai(S)−→[0, 1] be a residual charge, as defined in Section 4. Recall that R(S) ⊆ Bai(S),
but R(S) is not a subalgebra of Bai(S), because the Boolean algebra operations are differ-
ent (i.e. ∨ vs. ∪). But if we restrict ν to R(S), then we get a credence on R(S).18 Thus,
ν also defines a credence when restricted to any Boolean subalgebra of R(S). ♦
We can also construct credences on R(S) from the liminal density structures of Sections
5 and 6 (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, §6-§7).
Conditional expectation structures. From any credence, we can construct a system
of expectation functionals, which assign “expected values” to the utility profiles of feasible
acts. Recall that Bas(R) is the Boolean algebra of all basic subsets of R. A function f :
S → R is B-comeasurable if it is comeasurable with respect to B and Bas(R). Equivalently,
f is B-comeasurable if int (f−1(−∞, r]) ∈ B and int (f−1[r,∞)) ∈ B for all r ∈ R.
Example 7. (a) If f : S−→R is continuous, then f is R(S)-comeasurable.
(b) Let S = R. A continuous function f : R−→R is Bas(R)-comeasurable if there is a
finite sequence of points −∞ = r0 < r1 < r2 < r3 < · · · < rN = ∞ such that for each
18Proof. For any disjoint R,Q ∈ R(S), we have R ∨ Q = R unionsq Q unionsqM, where M is meager. Thus,
ν[R∨Q] = ν[R] + ν[Q] + ν[M] = ν[R] + ν[Q], because ν[M] = 0, because ν is a residual charge.
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n ∈ [1 . . . N ], either f is non-increasing on (rn−1, rn), or f is non-decreasing on (rn−1, rn).
In particular, any polynomial is Bas(R)-comeasurable, as is any non-decreasing or non-
increasing continuous function. But f(x) = sin(x) is not Bas(R)-comeasurable.
(c) Let S = RN , and let Bpoly(RN) be the Boolean algebra of regular polyhedra, from
Example 5(c). A function f : RN−→R is affine if f = f0 + r for some linear function
f0 : RN−→R and some constant r ∈ R. We say f is piecewise affine if there is a partition
P = {P1, . . . ,PN} of RN into regular polyhedra, and a collection f 1, . . . , fN : RN−→R
of affine functions, such that fRn = f
n
Rn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Any continuous piecewise
affine function is Bpoly(RN)-comeasurable.
(d) Let S = RN , and let Bsmth(RN) be the Boolean algebra of regular sets with piecewise
smooth boundaries, from Example 5(d). If f : RN−→R is any differentiable function such
that df(s) 6= 0 for all s ∈ RN , then f is Bsmth(RN)-comeasurable. ♦
Let Cb(S,R) be the Banach space of bounded, continuous, real-valued functions, with
the uniform norm ‖·‖∞. Let CB(S) be the set of all B-comeasurable functions in Cb(S,R).
This set is not necessarily closed under addition. So, let GB(S) be the closed linear subspace
of Cb(S,R) spanned by CB(S). (If B = R(S), then GB(S) = CB(S) = Cb(S,R).) For any
subset B ⊆ S, let GB(B) := {gB; g ∈ GB(S)}. This is a linear subspace of Cb(B,R). An
expectation functional on B is a linear functional E : GB(B)−→R such that ‖E‖∞ = 1, and
such that, for any f, g ∈ GB(B), if f(b) ≤ g(b) for all b ∈ B, then E[f ] ≤ E[g]. If 1 is the
constant function with value 1, then it follows that E[1] = 1.
Now let µ be a credence on B. A conditional expectation structure for S that is compatible
with µ is a collection E := {EB}B∈B, where, for all B ∈ B, EB is an expectation functional
on GB(B), and furthermore, if µ[B] > 0, then for any B-partition {Bn}Nn=1 of B, and any
g ∈ GB(B), we require
EB[g] =
1
µ[B]
N∑
n=1
µ[Bn]EBn [gBn ] . (12)
In particular, E = ES is an expectation functional on GB(S), and a version of equation
(12) holds for every B-partition of S. Equation (12) captures a key feature of Bayesianism:
conditional expectations are additively separable over the disjoint events of a B-partition.
Indeed, for any regular event B ∈ B with µ[B] > 0, the subcollection {ER}R∈B′ , where
B′ is the collection of sets in B that are contained in B, is itself a conditional expectation
structure on B, compatible with the conditional credence µB.
If g ∈ GB(S) and B ∈ B, we will abuse notation and write “EB[g]” to mean EB[gB].
We say E is strictly monotonic if, for all B ∈ B and g ∈ CB(B), if g(b) > 0 for all b ∈ B,
then EB[g] > 0. For every credence µ, there is a unique compatible conditional expectation
structure E; furthermore, if µ has full support, then E is strictly monotonic (see Theorem
4.3 from Pivato and Vergopoulos (2017b)).
Example 8. (a) Let S = (0, 1), let Bas(0, 1) be the Boolean algebra of basic open subsets
of (0, 1), and let µ be the credence from Example 6(a). Then the unique µ-compatible
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conditional expectation structure is defined as follows: for any B = (a1, b1)unionsq (a2, b2)unionsq· · ·unionsq
(aN , bN) in E, and any g ∈ GBas(0, 1),
EB[g] :=
1
µ[B]
(∫ b1
a1
g(x) dx +
∫ b2
a2
g(x) dx + · · · +
∫ bN
aN
g(x) dx
)
.
(b) Let S be a Baire space, let Bai(S) be the Boolean algebra of sets with the Baire
property, and let ν : Bai(S)−→[0, 1] be a residual charge, which induces a credence on
R(S) as in Example 6(b). The unique µ-compatible conditional expectation structure on
R(S) is defined by ER[f ] := 1
ν[R]
∫
R
f dν for any R ∈ R(S) and f ∈ Cb(S,R).19 ♦
SEU representations. We will say that a function u : X−→R is D-measurable if
u−1(B) ∈ D for any B ∈ Bas(R). For example, if D = R(X ), then any open, contin-
uous real-valued function on X is D-measurable (Fremlin, 2006, Appendix 4A2B, item
(f)(iii), p.453). If u : X−→R is D-measurable, and α : S−→X is (B,D)-comeasurable,
then u ◦ α : S−→R is B-comeasurable, and thus it can be evaluated by a conditional
expectation structure (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Proposition 5.4(a)).
Let A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D), and let {B}B∈B be a B-indexed conditional preference struc-
ture on A. Let u : X−→R be a D-measurable, continuous “utility” function. Let µ be
a credence on B. Let {EB}B∈B be the (unique) conditional expectation structure that is
compatible with µ. The pair (u, µ) is a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation for
{B}B∈B if, for any B ∈ B and any α, β ∈ A(B), we have(
α B β
)
⇐⇒
(
EB [u ◦ α] ≥ EB [u ◦ β]
)
. (13)
Theorem 9 Let S and X be topological spaces, with X connected. Let B and D be non-
trivial Boolean subalgebras of R(S) and R(X ) respectively. Let A be a collection of bounded
continuous and (B,D)-comeasurable functions from S into X . Let {B}B∈B be a condi-
tional preference structure on A which satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it satisfies (CEq),
(C), (M), (Dom), (Sep), (PC), and (TC) if and only if it has an SEU representation (13)
with full support. Finally, µ is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
The SEU representation obtained in Theorem 9 is somewhat simpler but less informa-
tive than the representations obtained so far: the agent’s beliefs only assign probabilities to
the observable events, and do not describe the way she copes with her informational con-
straints. But its advantage lies in its greater generality. This SEU representation does not
require any specific topological assumption on the state space, and it accommodates situ-
ations where the observable measurements only arise from a subalgebra of regular subsets.
Thus, Theorem 9 is adapted to decision problems where technological constraints restrict
both the acts which are feasible and the information which is available to the agent.
The proof of Theorem 9 is in Appendix A, but we will sketch the main steps here.
First, we use condition (Rch) to obtain a preference order on XN , for each B-partition
19See Proposition 6.1 of Pivato and Vergopoulos (2017b).
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{B1, . . . ,BN} of S. Then, we invoke (Sep), (C), (PC), (TC), (Dom) and (CEq) and a
theorem of Wakker (1988) to construct a continuous SEU representation for the latter
order. The decision weights associated to each component of XN provide the values of the
credence µ on each regular subset of the partition {B1, . . . ,BN}. Axiom (M) ensures that
the continuous utility function u thus constructed is D-measurable. Finally, we show that
the expected utility of any act is equal the utility of any of its certainty equivalents. The
SEU representation then easily follows. Appendix B presents another result, Theorem B1,
which is a simplified version of Theorem 9 that is adapted to situations where B = R(S)
and D = R(X ). Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4 are all corollaries of Theorem B1.
8 Stonean representations
In this section, we will provide an SEU representation which combines the strengths of
the results in Sections 5, 6 and 7. As in Sections 5 and 6, this representation uses a Borel
measure on a compact space (rather than the credences of Section 7). But unlike Sections
5 and 6, it uses only a Borel measure, without a liminal structure. Meanwhile, as in Section
7, this representation does not assume B = R(S); thus, it is compatible with informational
constraints. To obtain this representation, we must replace the original state space S with
new state space S∗, which, as in Section 6, can be interpreted as the “subjective state
space” of the agent. Formally, S∗ is the Stone space of the Boolean algebra B.20
Let B be any Boolean algebra. A truth valuation on B is a Boolean algebra homomor-
phism v : B−→T, where T := {T, F} is the two-element Boolean algebra, with the usual
operations ∨, ∧ and ¬. If B is a set of propositions about the world, each of which may
be true or false, then v is a complete, logically consistent assignment of truth values to
these propositions. In particular, if B is the algebra of all events which are observable to
the agent, then v is a complete subjective description of the world, as seen by this agent.
Let σ(B) be the set of all truth valuations of B. For any B ∈ B, let B∗ := {v ∈ σ(B);
v(B) = T}. The collection {B∗; B ∈ B} is a base of clopen sets for a topology on σ(B),
making it into a compact, totally disconnected Hausdorff space, called the Stone space of
B. The Boolean algebra structure of B is completely encoded in the topology of σ(B).21
Let S be any locally compact Hausdorff space, and let Sˇ be its Stone-Cˇech compact-
ification. Let B be a Boolean subalgebra of R(S), and define Bˇ := {Bˇ; B ∈ B}, where
we define Bˇ as in statement (SCˇ3) of Section 6. We say that B is generative if Bˇ is a base
for the topology of Sˇ. For example, the full Boolean algebra R(S) is generative (Pivato
and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Lemma 8.2). Let S∗ := σ(B). If B is generative, then there is
a continuous surjection p : S∗−→Sˇ (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Proposition 8.3).22
20Stinchcombe (1997, §7) also constructs an SEU representation based on Stone spaces. However, he
works in a very different framework, and his results are unrelated to ours.
21To be precise, the Stone Representation Theorem says that the map B 7→ B∗ is an isomorphism from
B to the Boolean algebra of clopen subsets of σ(B). Meanwhile, the Stone Duality Theorem says that σ
is a functorial isomorphism between the category of Boolean algebras and the category of compact, totally
disconnected Hausdorff spaces; see e.g. Johnstone (1986, §4.1) or Fremlin (2004, §311-§312).
22 If S is compact, then Sˇ = S. If also B = R(S), then p : S∗−→S is called the Gleason cover of S; it
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Heuristically, p is defined as follows. For any s ∈ S, let Bs := {B ∈ B; s ∈ B or s ∈ ¬B}.
Then we can define a “partial” truth valuation vs : Bs−→{T, F} by setting vs(B) = T if
s ∈ B and vs(B) = F if s ∈ ¬B. Typically, vs is not logically complete, because Bs ( B.
The preimage p−1{s} is the set of all logically consistent ways of extending vs to a complete
truth valuation on B. To be precise, vs(B) is not defined for any B ∈ B with s ∈ ∂B.
If v ∈ p−1{vs} then v “attaches” s to either B or ¬B, for every B ∈ B with s ∈ ∂B;
furthermore, v makes these attachments in a logically consistent way.
Let X be a Hausdorff space. Recall that any function α ∈ Cb(S,X ) has a unique
continuous extension αˇ ∈ C(Sˇ,X ) (see statement (SCˇ2) from Section 6). If we define
α∗ := αˇ ◦ p, then α∗ ∈ C(S∗,R). Now let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ), and let {B}B∈B be a B-indexed
conditional preference structure on A. A Stonean SEU representation for {B}B∈B is given
by a normal Borel probability measure µ∗ on Bor(S∗) and a continuous utility function
u : X−→R, such that, for all B ∈ B and all α, β ∈ A(B),(
α B β
)
⇐⇒
(∫
B∗
u ◦ α∗ dµ∗ ≥
∫
B∗
u ◦ β∗ dµ∗
)
. (14)
Theorem 10 Let S be a locally compact Hausdorff space, and let X be a connected Haus-
dorff space. Let B be a generative Boolean subalgebra of R(S), let D be a nontrivial Boolean
subalgebra of R(X ), and let A be a collection of bounded, continuous, (B,D)-comeasurable
functions from S into X . Let {B}B∈B be a conditional preference structure on A which
satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it satisfies (CEq), (C), (M), (Dom), (Sep), (PC), and
(TC) if and only if it admits a Stonean SEU representation (14), where µ∗ has full support
on S∗. Finally, µ∗ is unique, and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Theorem 10 has a natural and appealing interpretation. The agent is only able to
observe the events in the algebra B. So for her, a complete subjective description of the
world is given by a (logically consistent) assignment of truth-values to the events in B —
that is, an element of S∗. The measure µ∗ assigns probabilities to such complete subjective
descriptions. Given any act α : S−→X , it is possible to represent α as a function converting
each complete subjective description into an outcome —that is, a function α∗ : S∗−→X .
The agent then ranks each act α according to the µ∗-expected utility of α∗. This may seem
peculiar, but in fact it is quite psychologically natural. Perhaps S describes the world “as
it really is”. But for the agent, S∗ describes the world as she experiences it. Thus, for her,
an SEU representation on S∗ might be more natural than one on S itself.
There is an interesting duality between Theorem 10 and the model of Lipman (1999). In
Lipman’s model, as in ours, the agent is equipped with a mental vocabulary of propositions,
each of which can be either true or false. In Lipman’s model, the “true” state space is the set
of all logically consistent assignments of truth-values to these propositions. But the agent’s
subjective state space also includes some logically inconsistent truth-value assignments;
these so-called “impossible possible worlds” reflect her lack of logical omniscience. In our
model, by contrast, S is a set of consistent but logically incomplete truth-value assignments,
whereas S∗ is the set of all consistent and complete assignments.
plays an important role in categorical topology (Johnstone, 1986, §3.10).
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Which of S or S∗ is the “correct” state space is a matter of interpretation. According
to the Law of the Excluded Middle, every statement is either true or false. Thus, only S∗
could be the correct state space, and S is at best some “subjective approximation”; the
incompleteness of the truth-value assignments in S must reflect a lack of information or a
failure of the imagination. But there are also countervailing views in philosophy, according
to which some statements simply do not have an objectively correct truth value. In the
philosophical analysis of vagueness, this view is called supervaluationism; in the philosophy
of time, it is called metaphysical indeterminism (about the future); and in the philosophy of
mathematics, it aligns closely with intuitionism (concerning formally undecidable proposi-
tions). Finally, it is a plausible attitude towards lacunae in systems of “socially constructed
truths” such as legal corpora, codes of etiquette, and the grammars of natural languages.
Of course, an agent can “take a position” on these statements if she so desires, but she
is misguided if she thinks any of these positions is any more objectively correct than any
other. According to this view, the (incomplete) valuations in S already capture all that
can be objectively known about the world, and the extra information putatively encoded
in the states of S∗ is mere prejudice or unjustified speculation. Nevertheless, Theorem
10 shows that the agent can assign subjective probabilities to these “prejudices” in an
internally coherent way, and use them to guide her decisions.
The previous paragraph assumed that B was a complete list of all meaningful state-
ments which could be made about the world. But if B is incomplete, then it is possible that
neither S nor S∗ is the correct state space; both of them are merely subjective approxima-
tions. Then the relevant question is which one is a more suitable basis for decision-making.
Theorems 9 and 10 show that the agent can use either S or S∗ as the domain of her SEU
representation; the choice is a matter of mathematical convenience.
9 Prior literature
Several previous papers have restricted the Savage universal domain of preference by intro-
ducing measurability constraints. In fact, Savage (1954) explicitly notes that his axiomatic
construction works equally well for preferences over acts that are measurable with respect
to a σ-algebra, but only produces finitely additive probabilities. Arrow (1970) enriches the
Savage axioms so as to further derive the σ-additivity of probability measures. See also
Kopylov (2010). Epstein and Zhang (2001) construct a theory of “probabilistic sophisti-
cation” on a collection of acts that are measurable with respect to a “λ-system”. Finally,
Kopylov (2007) provides both SEU maximization and probabilistic sophistication on the
weaker structure of so-called mosaics, which include Boolean algebras.
Some papers aim explicitly at deriving continuous utility functions from preferences.
For example, Grandmont (1972) obtained continuous utility functions in a von Neuman and
Morgenstern (1947) framework. Other papers consider acts from a measurable state space
into a topological outcome space, typically assumed to be connected and separable. For
example, Wakker (1985, 1988) and Wakker (1989a, Chapter 5) characterized continuous,
state-independent SEU representations in this setting. Wakker (1987) characterized con-
tinuous and state-dependent SEU over a finite state space, while Wakker and Zank (1999)
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characterized it over any measurable space. Wakker (1989b) characterized continuous Cho-
quet expected utility representations over a finite state space. Finally, Casadesus-Masanell
et al. (2000) characterized continuous maximin expected utility representations.
Like us, Zhou (1999) considers the case where both the state space and the outcome
space are topological spaces, and acts are continuous functions. But unlike us, he restricts
attention to the case where the outcomes are themselves lotteries over some finite set of
consequences, so that acts correspond to “two-stage lotteries” of the kind considered by
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). In this framework, Zhou proves versions of Anscombe and
Aumann’s SEU representation theorem, as well as the Choquet expected utility represen-
tation theorem of Schmeidler (1989), in both cases obtaining continuous utility functions.
Unlike Zhou, we do not assume any special structure on the outcome space; our framework
is more like the framework of Savage, rather than that of Anscombe and Aumann.
Finally, as we have noted earlier in the paper, several of our SEU representations
have common features with past models in decision theory which have employed Stone
spaces (Stinchcombe, 1997), Stone-Cˇech compactifications (Chichilnisky, 1996, 2000, 2009;
Chichilnisky and Heal, 1997), or other “subjective state spaces” (Jaffray and Wakker, 1993;
Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1994; Mukerji, 1997; Lipman, 1999; Alon, 2015).
Conclusion
This paper has presented a series of SEU representations for preferences under uncertainty.
However, it is now well-established that the SEU model is often not descriptively accurate.
In some cases, it may not even be normatively compelling, e.g. when the agent faces
ambiguity, where she lacks even sufficient information to form probabilistic beliefs about
the state of the world. Thus, there has been much recent interest in “non-SEU” models of
decision-making under uncertainty. However, there has been little exploration of such non-
SEU models in explicitly topological environments like the ones considered in this paper.23
In that respect, the results in the present paper can be seen as benchmarks, which set the
stage for future research into non-SEU representations on topological spaces.
We have assumed that only continuous acts are feasible. This may seem unduly restric-
tive. Of course, Borel-measurable functions can be extremely complex, and it is unlikely
that all such functions could be technologically feasible acts. But it seems plausible that
piecewise continuous acts could be feasible (i.e. functions which are continuous on each cell
of some regular partition of the state space). By restricting ourselves to continuous acts to
obtain our SEU representations, we have actually solved a harder problem. It is straight-
forward to extend these SEU representations to preferences over piecewise continuous acts
(Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017a).
23Wakker (1989b), Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000), and Zhou (1999) are exceptions. But the first two
only put a topology on the outcome space.
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Appendices
Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 9. Appendix B contains the proofs of the SEU
representations from Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8. Appendix C develops a variant of the liminal
SEU representation from Section 5, but for normal Hausdorff spaces rather than compact
Hausdorff spaces. Finally Appendix D gives necessary and sufficient conditions for (Rch).
A Proof of Theorem 9
The proof of Theorem 9 has two preliminary stages. First, Proposition A3 uses (Rch) and
axioms (Sep), (C), (TC), (PC), (Dom), (CEq) and (M) to construct a credence µ on B
and a continuous and D-measurable utility function u using a theorem of Wakker (1988)
for continuous additive representations. Second, Proposition A6 shows that the expected
utility of any act, with respect to µ and u, equals the utility of any certainty equivalent of
this act. The rest of the appendix uses these findings to construct the SEU representations
and establishes the necessity of the axioms, as well as the uniqueness of the representation.
Throughout this appendix, we maintain the following standing assumptions:
S and X are topological spaces, with X connected. B ⊆ R(S) and D ⊆ R(X )
are nontrivial Boolean subalgebras, A ⊆ Cb(S,B;X ,D), and {B}B∈B is a
conditional preference structure on A that satisfies (Rch).
Lemma A1 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (C), (Dom) and (CEq). Let B ∈ B.
Define the function KB : X−→A(B) by KB(x) := κxB for all x ∈ X . Then KB is continuous
relative to the B-order topology on A(B).
Proof. For any α, γ ∈ A(B), let (α, γ)B := {β ∈ A(B); α ≺B β ≺B γ}. This collection of
sets (for all α, γ ∈ A(B)) forms a base for the B-order topology on A(B). So it suffices
to show that K−1B [(α, γ)B ] is open in X , for all α, β ∈ A(B).
Axiom (CEq) says there exist x, z ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB and γ ≈B κzB. Define
(x, z)xp := {y ∈ X ; x ≺xp y ≺xp z}. Axiom (C) says this is an open subset of X . Now,
for any y ∈ X , we have(
y ∈ K−1B [(α, γ)B ]
)
⇐⇒
(
KB(y) ∈ (α, γ)B
)
⇐⇒
(
α ≺B κyB ≺B γ
)
⇐
(∗)⇒
(
κxB ≺B κyB ≺B κzB
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
x ≺xp y ≺xp z
)
⇐⇒
(
y ∈ (x, z)xp
)
.
Here, (∗) is because α ≈B κxB and γ ≈B κzB, while (†) is by axiom (Dom) and its
contrapositive. Thus, we see that K−1B [(α, γ)B ] = (x, z)xp , which is an open subset of
X . Since this holds for all α, γ ∈ A(B), we conclude that KB is continuous. 2
It will be convenient to use the following equivalent formulation of axiom (PC).
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(PC′) Let B = D∨E as in axiom (Sep). Let O ⊆ A(B) be open in the B-order topology,
and let α ∈ O. Then there exist sets OD ⊆ A(D) and OE ⊆ A(E) which are open in
the D-order topology and E -order topology, with αD ∈ OD and αE ∈ OE , such
that, for any β ∈ A(B), if βD ∈ OD and βE ∈ OE , then β ∈ O.
Lemma A2 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (PC), (C), (Dom) and (CEq). Consider
a B-partition P = {E1, . . . , EN} of S with N ≥ 2. There exists a mapping ΦP : XN−→A
that is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN and the S-order topology
on A and satisfies ΦP(x)En ≈En κxnEn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and any x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN .
Proof. Let x := (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN . Define α1 := κx1E1 , an element of A(E1). Condition
(Rch) yields α2 ∈ A(E1 ∨ E2) such that α2E1 = κx1E1 and α2E2 ≈E2 κx2E2 . Next, (Rch) yields
α3 ∈ A(E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3) such that α3E1∨E2 = α2 and α3E3 ≈E3 κx3E3 . In particular, this means
that α3En ≈En κxnEn for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Inductively, let M ∈ [4 . . . N ], and suppose we have some αM−1 ∈ A(E1 ∨ · · · ∨ EM−1)
such that αM−1Em ≈Em κxmEm for all m ∈ [1 . . .M). (Rch) yields αM ∈ A(E1 ∨ · · · ∨ EM)
such that αME1∨···∨EM−1 = α
M−1 and αMEM ≈EM κxMEM . In particular, this means that
αMEm ≈Em κxmEm for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ].
Setting M = N in this construction, we obtain some αN such that αNEn ≈En κxnEn for
all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Now define ΦP(x) := αN . To prove the continuity of ΦP, we need a
preliminary result, which extends axiom (PC).
Claim 1: Let O ⊆ A be open in the S-order topology, and let α ∈ O. Then for all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], there is a set On ⊆ A(En) which is open in the En-order topology, with
αEn ∈ On, such that, for any β ∈ A, if βEn ∈ On for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], then β ∈ O.
Proof. Let D1 := E2 ∨ · · · ∨ EN . Thus, B := E1 ∨ D1. Setting D := D1 and E := E1
in axiom (PC′), we obtain some O1 ⊆ A(E1) and Q1 ⊆ A(D1) with αE1 ∈ O1 and
αD1 ∈ Q1, such that, for any β ∈ A(B), if βE1 ∈ O1 and βD1 ∈ Q1 then β ∈ O.
Now let D2 := E3 ∨ · · · ∨ EN . Thus, D1 := E2 ∨ D2. Setting D := D2 and E := E2
in axiom (PC′), we obtain some O2 ⊆ A(E2) and Q2 ⊆ A(D2) with αE2 ∈ O2 and
αD2 ∈ Q2, such that, for any β ∈ A(D1), if βE2 ∈ O2 and βD2 ∈ Q2 then β ∈ Q1. In
particular, this means that, for any β ∈ A(G), if βE1 ∈ O1, βE2 ∈ O2 and βD2 ∈ Q2,
then β ∈ O.
Inductively, let M ∈ [3 . . . N), let DM−1 := EM ∨ · · · ∨ EN , and suppose that, for
all m ∈ [1 . . .M), we have constructed Om ⊆ A(Em) (open in the Em-topology) with
αEm ∈ Om, along with some QM−1 ⊆ A(DM−1) (open in the DM−1-topology) with
αDM−1 ∈ QM−1, such that, for any β ∈ A(G), if βEm ∈ Om for all m ∈ [1 . . .M) and
βDM−1 ∈ QM−1, then β ∈ O. Now letDM := EM+1∨· · ·∨EN . Thus, DM−1 := EM∨DM .
Setting D := DM and E := EM in axiom (PC′), we obtain some OM ⊆ A(EM) and
QM ⊆ A(DM) with αEM ∈ OM and αDM ∈ QM , such that, for any β ∈ A(DM−1), if
βEM ∈ OM and βDM ∈ QM then β ∈ QM−1. In particular, this means that, for any
β ∈ A(G), if βEm ∈ Om for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ] and βDM ∈ QM , then β ∈ O.
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Suppose M = N − 1 in the previous paragraph. Then DM = EN . Thus, if we define
ON := QN−1, then we have obtained sets O1, . . . ,ON satisfying the claim. 3 Claim 1
It remains to show that ΦP is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN
and the S-order topology on A. To see this, let O ⊆ A be open in the S-order
topology. It is sufficient to show that U := Φ−1P (O) is open in the product topology on
XN . To do this, let x ∈ U ; we will construct an open neighbourhood around x inside U .
Let α := ΦP(x) ∈ A. Then, α ∈ O. For any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let On ⊆ A(En) be the
open subset in the En-order topology obtained in Claim 1, and define Vn := K−1En (On).
By Lemma A1, each KEn is a continuous function from X to A(En). So Vn is an open
subset of X for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Define V := V1 × . . .× VN ; then V is an open subset
of XN in the product topology.
Claim 2: x ∈ V .
Proof. Any open set in an order topology is a union of order intervals, and any order
interval is a union of indifference classes (because if an order interval contains some
element γ, then it also contains all other elements which are indifferent to γ). Thus,
any open set is a union of indiffererence classes.
Now fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. By Claim 1, we have αEn ∈ On. Moreover, by the definition
of α and the construction of ΦP, we have αEn = ΦP(x)En ≈En κxnEn . By the remark
in the previous paragraph, and since On is open in the En-order topology, we obtain
κxnEn ∈ On. Then, xn ∈ Vn. Since this holds for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we obtain x ∈V1 × . . .× VN = V . 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: V ⊆ U .
Proof. Let y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ V and define β = ΦP(y) ∈ A. Fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then
yn ∈ Vn, so by definition of Vn, we have κynEn ∈ On. By the construction of ΦP, we have
βEn = ΦP(y)En ≈En κ
yn
En . Since On is open in the En-order topology and κynEn ∈ On,
On must also contain any act that is indifferent to κynEn . Thus, βEn ∈ On. This holds
for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then, by Claim 1, β ∈ O. Finally, y ∈ Φ−1P (O) = U . 3 Claim 3
Thus, V is an open neighbourhood around x (in the product topology), which is contained
in U . We can construct such a neighbourhood around any x ∈ U . Thus, U is open in
the product topology. Hence ΦP is continuous, as claimed. 2
Consider any regular partition P = (B1, . . . ,BN) of S with N ≥ 2. Let ΦP be the mapping
from Lemma A2. We then define a preference order P on XN in the following way: For
any x,y ∈ XN , (
x P y
)
⇐⇒
(
ΦP(x) S ΦP(y)
)
. (A1)
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Proposition A3 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (Sep), (C), (TC), (PC), (Dom) and
(CEq). Then, there exists a credence µ on B with full support and a continuous function
u : X−→R such that, for any B-partition P = (B1, . . . ,BN) of S with N ≥ 2, we have(
x P y
)
⇐⇒
(
N∑
n=1
µ(Bn) · u(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
µ(Bn) · u(yn)
)
, (A2)
where P is defined by formula (A1). Moreover, µ is unique, and u is unique up to positive
affine transformation. Finally, u is an ordinal utility function for xp. If {B}B∈B also
satisfies axiom (M), then u is D-measurable.
Proof. Fix a B-partition P = (B1, . . . ,BN) of S with N ≥ 2 (such a partition exists because
B is nontrivial). Define P on XN according to formula (A1).
Claim 1: P is continuous with respect to the product topology on XN .
Proof. Fix y ∈ XN and define β := ΦP(y) ∈ A. Let O = {α ∈ A, α S β}; this is an
open set in the S-order topology on A. Then, by Lemma A2, U := Φ−1P (O) is an
open subset of XN in the product topology. Moreover, for any x ∈ XN , we have(
x P y
)
⇐
(∗)⇒
(
ΦP(x) S β
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
x ∈ U
)
,
where (∗) is by formula (A1) and (†) is by the definition of U . Thus, the strict upper
contour set of P at y is equal to U and, therefore, an open set in the product topology
on XN . A similar proof works for strict lower contour sets. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: P satisfies Cardinal Coordinate Independence: For all n,m ∈ [1 . . . N ],
all x,y,v,w ∈ XN and all a, b, c, d ∈ X , if anx−n P bny−n, cnx−n P dny−n and
amv−m P bmw−m, then cmv−m P dmw−m.
Proof. Define (aBnα), (bBnβ), (cBnα), (dBnβ) ∈ A by (aBnα) := ΦP(anx−n), (bBnβ) :=
ΦP(bny−n), (cBnα) := ΦP(cnx−n) and (dBnβ) := ΦP(dny−n). Then, by the definition
(A1) of P, we have (aBnα) S (bBnβ) and (cBnα) S (dBnβ). Moreover, by the def-
inition of ΦP, we have (aBnα)Bn ≈Bn κaBn , (bBnβ)Bn ≈Bn κbBn , (cBnα)Bn ≈Bn κcBn and
(dBnβ)Bn ≈Bn κdBn . Meanwhile, (aBnα)Bl ≈Bl (cBnα)Bl and (bBnβ)Bl ≈Bl (dBnβ)Bl
for all l ∈ [1 . . . N ] with l 6= n. So if we set Q := ¬Bn, then by (Sep) we obtain
(aBnα)Q ≈Q (cBnα)Q and (bBnβ)Q ≈Q (dBnβ)Q. This shows that (a Bn; b)  (c Bn; d).
Meanwhile, define (aBmγ), (bBmδ), (cBmγ), (dBmδ) ∈ A by (aBmγ) := ΦP(amv−m),
(bBmδ) := ΦP(bmw−m), (cBmγ) := ΦP(cmv−m) and (dBmδ) := ΦP(dmw−m). Pro-
ceeding as above, we obtain (aBmγ) S (bBmδ) with (aBmγ)Bm ≈Bm κaBm , (bBmδ)Bm
≈Bm κbBm , (cBmγ)Bm ≈Bm κcBm and (dBmδ)Bm ≈Bm κdBm . Moreover, set Q′ := ¬Bm.
Then we also have (aBmγ)Q′ ≈Q′ (cBmγ)Q′ and (bBmδ)Q′ ≈Q′ (dBmδ)Q′ . Now, if it
is not the case that cmv−m P dmw−m, then (A1) implies that it is also not the case
that (cBmγ) S (dBmδ). Thus, (cBmγ) ≺S (dBmδ) (because S is a complete order).
But this means that (a
Bm
; b) ≺ (c Bm; d), which contradicts (TC). Thus, we must have
cmv−m P dmw−m, as claimed. 3 Claim 2
38
By Claims 1 and 2, and the connectedness of X , the assumptions of Wakker’s (1988)
Theorem 6.2 are satisfied. So there exist a continuous function uP : X−→R and a
probability vector (µP(B1), . . . , µP(BN)) ∈ ∆([1 . . . N ]) such that, for any x,y ∈ XN ,
(
x P y
)
⇐⇒
(
N∑
n=1
µP(Bn) · uP(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
µP(Bn) · uP(yn)
)
. (A3)
Moreover, the probability vector is unique, and the function is unique up to positive
affine transformation.
By the nontriviality of S and axiom (Dom), there exist l, o ∈ X with l xp o. Then,
still by (Dom), κlB B κoB for any B ∈ B. Fix n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and let x,y ∈ XN be
such that xn = l, yn = o, and xm = ym = o for any m ∈ [1 . . . N ] \ {n}. Then,
ΦP(x)Bm ≈Bm κoBm ≈Bm ΦP(y)Bm for anym ∈ [1 . . . N ]\{n}. LetQ = ¬Bn. By iterative
applications of (Sep), we have ΦP(x)Q ≈Q ΦP(y)Q. Moreover, we have ΦP(x)Bn ≈Bn
κlBn Bn κoBn ≈Bn ΦP(y)Bn Another application of (Sep) yields ΦP(x) Bn ΦP(y) and,
by formula (A1), x P y. Then, from (A2) and the definition of x and y, we get
µP(Bn) · [uP(l)− uP(o)] > 0.
This inequality first shows that µP(Bn) > 0, and this holds for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. It also
shows uP(l) > uP(o). Thus, we obtain a unique function uP providing a representation
as in formula (A3) and satisfying uP(l) = 1 and uP(o) = 0. From now on, we assume
that the functions uP are normalized in this way.
Claim 3: For any two B-partitions P and Q of S, each with at least two cells,
uP = uQ. Moreover, if B ∈ B is a cell in each of P and Q, then µP(B) = µQ(B).
Proof. LetP = {P1, . . . ,PN} with Pn ∈ B for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and letQ = (Q1, . . . ,QM)
with Qm ∈ B for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ]. Consider first the case where Q refines P —that
is, for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ], there is some n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that Qm ⊆ Pn. For all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Mn ⊆ [1 . . .M ] be the set of m ∈ [1 . . .M ] such that Qm ⊆ Pn.
Then, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], the subcollection {Qm, m ∈ Mn} is a B-partition of Pn.
For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we define
pn :=
∑
m∈Mn
µQ(Qm). (A4)
Then, the collection (p1, . . . , pN) is a probability vector on [1 . . . N ]. Moreover, for any
x ∈ XN , define x′ ∈ XM by setting
x′m = xn, for all m ∈Mn and n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. (A5)
Note that by (Sep) we have the following indifference for any x ∈ XN :
ΦP(x) ≈S ΦQ(x′) (A6)
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Thus, for any x,y ∈ XN ,(
x P y
)
⇐
(a)
⇒
(
ΦP(x) S ΦP(y)
)
⇐
(b)
⇒
(
ΦQ(x
′) S ΦQ(y′)
)
⇐
(a)
⇒
(
x′ Q y′
)
⇐
(c)
⇒
(
M∑
m=1
µQ(Qm) · uQ(x′m) ≥
M∑
m=1
µQ(Qm) · uQ(y′m)
)
⇐
(d)
⇒
(
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈Mn
µQ(Qm) · uQ(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈Mn
µQ(Qm) · uQ(yn)
)
⇐
(e)
⇒
(
N∑
n=1
pn · uQ(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
pn · uQ(yn)
)
.
Here, both (a) are by equation (A1), (b) is by equation (A6), (c) is by equation (A3),
(d) by equation (A5), and (e) is by equation (A4). Thus, uQ and (p1, . . . , pN) provide
a representation of P as in equation (A3). By uniqueness, we obtain uP = uQ.
Moreover, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ],
µP(Pn) =
∑
m∈Mn
µQ(Qm). (A7)
Now, if P and Q have a common cell B ∈ B, then B = Pn = Qm for some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]
and m ∈ [1 . . .M ] such that Mn = {m}. Then, equation (A7) yields µP(B) = µQ(B).
Now consider the general case, where neither P nor Q refines the other. Let P⊗Q :=
{P ∩Q; P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q}. Then P⊗Q is a B-partition which refines both P and
Q. Now apply to the previous argument to P and P⊗Q on the one hand, and to Q
and P⊗Q on the other hand to conclude. 3 Claim 3
Now, we define a set function µ : B−→[0, 1] by setting µ(S) = 1, µ(∅) = 0 and, for
any B ∈ B, µ(B) = µP(B) where P = {B,¬B}. Note that, for any nonempty B ∈ B,
µ(B) > 0 since we have already proved that µP(B) > 0.
Claim 4: µ is a credence on B with full support.
Proof. Consider a collection {P1, . . . ,PN} of pairwise disjoint regular subsets in B, and
let B be its join. Consider first the case where B = S, and set P = {P1, . . . ,PN}.
Then, P is a B-partition of S. We have
N∑
n=1
µ(Pn) (∗)
N∑
n=1
µP(Pn) (†) 1. (A8)
Here (∗) is by Claim 3, and (†) is because µP is a probability distribution. Now, if
B 6= S, set PN+1 := ¬B. Consider Q = {P1, . . . ,PN ,PN+1} and Q′ = {B,PN+1}, two
B-partitions of S. We have
N∑
n=1
µ(Pn) (a) 1− µQ(PN+1) (b) 1− µQ′(PN+1) (c) µQ′(B) (d) µ(B). (A9)
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Here, both (a) and (c) are by suitable versions of equation (A8) while both (b) and
(d) are by Claim 3. Thus, µ is a credence. Finally, µ is fully supported since it has
positive values at any nonempty regular subset in B. 3 Claim 4
Set u := uQ for some B-partition Q of S with at least two cells. For any B-partition
P = {P1, . . . ,PN} of S with N ≥ 2, Claim 3 yields u = uP and µP(Pn) = µ(Pn) for all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. This, together with equation (A3), completes the proof of formula (A2).
Claim 5: u is an ordinal utility function for xp.
Proof. Fix x, y ∈ X . Since B is nondegenerate, there exists a B-partition P =
{B1, . . . ,BN} of S with N ≥ 2. Let x,y ∈ XN be defined by xn := x and yn := y for
any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then, we have(
x xp y
)
⇐
(a)
⇒
(
κx S κy
)
⇐
(b)
⇒
(
ΦP(x) S ΦP(y)
)
⇐
(c)
⇒
(
N∑
n=1
µ(Bn) · u(x) ≥
N∑
n=1
µ(Bn) · u(y)
)
⇐⇒
(
u(x) ≥ u(y)
)
,
where (a) is by the definition of xp, (b) is because by inductive applications of (Sep)
and because ΦP(x)Bn ≈Bn κxBn and ΦP(y)Bn ≈Bn κyBn , for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Mean-
while, (c) is by formula (A2). 3 Claim 5
Claim 6: If {B}B∈B satisfies axiom (M), then u is D-measurable.
Proof. Fix an open interval O ⊆ R. We must show that u−1(O) ∈ D.
First, suppose O = (q,∞) for some q ∈ R. If u(x) < q for all x ∈ X , then
u−1(q,∞) = ∅ ∈ D. On the other hand, if u(x) > q for all x ∈ X , then u−1(q,∞) =
X ∈ D. If neither of these cases holds, then there must exist x, z ∈ X with u(x) ≤
q ≤ u(z). Since u is continuous and X is connected, the Intermediate Value Theorem
yields some y ∈ X such that u(y) = q. But then u−1(q,∞) = {z ∈ X ; z xp y},
because, by Claim 5 , u is an ordinal utility representation for xp. Thus, u−1(q,∞)
is an open upper contour set of xp, so u−1(q,∞) ∈ D, by axiom (M).
The same argument works if O = (−∞, r) for some r ∈ R. Finally, if O = (q, r),
then O = (−∞, r)∩ (q,∞), so u−1(O) = u−1(−∞, r)∩ u−1(q,∞) is an intersection of
two elements of D, and thus, an element of D.
Finally, let B be an arbitrary basic subset of R. Then B := (a1, b1) unionsq (a2, b2) unionsq
· · · unionsq (aN , bN) for some −∞ ≤ a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 < · · · < aN < bN ≤ ∞. For all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Dn := u−1(an, bn); then Dn ∈ D by the previous paragraph, and
u−1(B) =
N⊔
n=1
Dn. It remains to show that this union is an element of D.
Claim 6A:
N∨
n=1
Dn ⊆
N⊔
n=1
Dn.
41
Proof. (by contradiction) Suppose x ∈
(
N∨
n=1
Dn
)
\
(
N⊔
n=1
Dn
)
. Now,
N∨
n=1
Dn = int
[
clos
(
N⊔
n=1
Dn
)]
= int
[
N⋃
n=1
clos(Dn)
]
.
Thus, x ∈ int
[⋃N
n=1 clos(Dn)
]
, but x 6∈ Dn = int[clos(Dn)] for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Thus, if U is any open neighbourhood around x, then U overlaps ⋃Nn=1 clos(Dn)
but U 6⊆ clos(Dn) for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]; hence there must be at least two distinct
n,m ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that U ∩ clos(Dn) 6= ∅ and U ∩ clos(Dm) 6= ∅. Define
 :=
1
4
min
n∈[1...N)
(an+1 − bn).
Then  > 0 because bn < an+1 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], by hypothesis. Let r := u(x),
and let V := (r − , r + ). Then V is an open neighbourhood around r. Let
U := u−1(V); then U is an open neighbourhood around x (because u is continuous),
so by the previous paragraph there exist distinct n < m ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that
U ∩ clos(Dn) 6= ∅ and U ∩ clos(Dm) 6= ∅. Now, u(U) = V (by definition of U),
while u[clos(Dn)] ⊆ clos(an, bn) = [an, bn] and u[clos(Dm)] ⊆ clos(am, bm) = [am, bm]
(because u is continuous). Thus, we must have V ∩ [an, bn] 6= ∅ and V ∩ [am, bm] 6= ∅.
But this is impossible, because V is an interval of length 2 ≤ (am − bn)/2, by
construction.
To avoid the contradiction, we must have x ∈ Dn for some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. This
argument applies to all x ∈
N∨
n=1
Dn. Thus,
N∨
n=1
Dn ⊆
N⊔
n=1
Dn, as claimed. O Claim 6A
Clearly,
N⊔
n=1
Dn ⊆
N∨
n=1
Dn. Together with Claim 6A, this implies that
N⊔
n=1
Dn =
N∨
n=1
Dn.
Thus, it is an element of D, as desired. 3 Claim 6
This completes the proof. 2
Our SEU representation requires one more technical preliminary.
Proposition A4 (Pivato and Vergopoulos, 2017b, Theorem 4.3) Let S be any topological
space, let B be any Boolean subalgebra of R(S), and let µ be a credence with full support
on B. There exists a unique, strictly monotonic conditional expectation system E that is
compatible with µ.
Lemma A5 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axiom (Sep). For any B ∈ B, consider a B-
partition P = {B1, . . . ,BN} of B. For any α, β ∈ A(B), if αBn Bn βBn for any n ∈
[1 . . . N ], then α B β.
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Proof. We proceed by induction. Consider first a subset B ∈ B and a two-cell partition
P = {B1,B2} of B. Let α, β ∈ A(B) be such that αB1 B1 βB1 and αB2 B2 βB2 .
By (Rch), there exists γ ∈ A(B) such that γB1 ≈B1 αB1 and γB2 ≈B2 βB2 . Then, we
have αB1 ≈B1 γB1 and αB2 B2 γB2 . By (Sep), we obtain α B γ. Similarly, we have
γB1 B1 βB1 and γB2 ≈B2 βB2 . Still by (Sep), we obtain γ B β. Since α B γ and
γ B β, we finally obtain α B β as desired.
Consider now a subset B ∈ B and an N -cell partition P = {B1, . . . ,BN} of B with
N ≥ 2. Let α, β ∈ A(B) be such that αBn Bn βBn for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let
Q = B1 ∨ . . . ∨ BN1 . By induction, we have αQ Q βQ. But since {Q,BN} is a two-
cell partition of B, and since we have αQ Q βQ and αBN BN βBN , the previous
paragraph yields α B β as desired. 2
Proposition A6 Suppose {B}B∈B satisfies axioms (Sep), (C), (M), (TC), (PC), (Dom)
and (CEq). Let µ be the credence and u be the utility function from Proposition A3. Let
{EB}B∈B be the unique µ-compatible conditional expectation system from Proposition A4.
Then, for any B ∈ B, α ∈ A(B) and x ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB, we have
EB [u ◦ α] = u(x). (A10)
Proof. For any B ∈ B, and any g ∈ GB(B), we define E˜B[g] := µ[B]EB[g]. Recall that
EB[1] = 1. Thus, E˜B[1] = µ[B]. Thus, for any r ∈ R, the linearity of EB implies
E˜B[r1] = r µ[B]. (A11)
Let B ∈ B and α ∈ A(B). Consider first the case where u ◦ α is constant over B. Then
there exists y ∈ X such that u ◦ α(s) = u(y) for any s ∈ B. Then EB [u ◦ α] = u(y)
by the linearity of EB. On the other hand, by Proposition A3, u is an ordinal utility
function for xp. Therefore, α(s) ≈xp y for any s ∈ B. By (Dom), we obtain α ≈B κyB
and thus, κxB ≈B κyB by transitivity. Still by (Dom) we have x ≈xp y. Thus, u(x) = u(y),
because u is an ordinal utility function for xp. This shows EB [u ◦ α] = u(x), as desired.
Consider now the case where u◦α takes at least two different values over B. Let β ∈ A
be such that βB = α. Let K := clos[β(S)] (i.e. the closure of the image set β(S) in X );
then K is compact, because β ∈ Cb(S,B;X ;D). Recall that u : X−→R is continuous,
by Proposition A3. Thus, u is bounded when restricted to K. If we define U := u◦β(S),
then U is a bounded subset of R —say, U ⊆ [−M,M ] for some M ∈ N.
Let  > 0. Let N ∈ N be large enough that 1
N
< . For all n ∈ [−MN . . .MN),
let Cn := (u ◦ β)−1[ nN , n+1N ]. Recall that u : X−→R is D-measurable by Proposition A3,
while β is (B,D)-comeasurable, by the definition of A. Thus, u ◦ β is B-comeasurable,
by Proposition 5.4(a) of Pivato and Vergopoulos (2017b). Thus if Bn := int(Cn) ∩ B,
then Bn is a (possibly empty) element of B. Let P−MN = B−MN and, for any m ∈
(−MN . . .MN), define Pm := Bm ∩ (¬Bm−1). Then P−MN , . . . ,PMN−1 are disjoint
(possibly empty) elements of B. Let N := {n ∈ [−NM . . .NM); Pn 6= ∅}. Finally,
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define P := {Pn}n∈N ; then P is a B-partition of B. Since u ◦ α takes at least two
different values over B, we can take N to be large enough to make sure that P has at
least two cells.
Claim 1: For any n ∈ N , there exist values xn, yn ∈ X such that
n
N
≤ u(xn) ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn) ≤ n+ 1
N
, (A12)
for all p ∈ Pn.
Proof. Recall that K := clos[β(S)] is a compact subset of X . Thus, its image u(K) is a
compact subset of R, because u is continuous. Thus, the set Wn := u(K) ∩ [ nN , n+1N ]
is compact. Thus, wn := min(Wn) and wn := max(Wn) are well-defined. Let xn ∈
u−1{wn} and let yn ∈ u−1{wn}. Thus, u(xn) = wn ≥ nN , while u(yn) = wn ≤ n+1N ,
For any p ∈ Pn, we have α(p) = β(p) and β(p) ∈ K, and also u ◦ α(p) ∈ [ nN , n+1N ]
by definition of Pn; thus, u ◦ α(p) ∈ Wn. Thus, wn ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ wn, i.e. u(xn) ≤
u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn), as claimed. 3 Claim 1
Now define u, u ∈ R in the following way:
u =
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(xn) and u =
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(yn).
Claim 2: u ≤ E˜B [u ◦ α] ≤ u
Proof. Fix n ∈ N . For all p ∈ Pn, formula (A12) says u(xn) ≤ u ◦ α(p) ≤ u(yn), and
thus,
µ[Pn] · u(xn) (∗) E˜Pn [u(xn) 1] ≤
(†)
E˜Pn [u ◦ α]
≤
(†)
E˜Pn [u(yn) 1] (∗) µ[Pn] · u(yn). (A13)
Here, both (∗) are by equation (A11), and both (†) are by inequality (A12) and the
monotonicity of the conditional expectation operator EB. Summing the versions of
inequality (A13) obtained for every n ∈ N , we obtain
u =
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≤
∑
n∈N
E˜Pn [u ◦ α] ≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(yn) = u.
The result then follows by noting that the middle term in this inequality is equal to
E˜B [u ◦ α] thanks to equation (12) 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: u ≤ µ(B) · u(x) ≤ u.
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Proof. Fix o ∈ X . Define a′,b′, c′ ∈ XN in the following way:
For any n ∈ N , a′n := xn, b′n := x and c′n := yn.
Consider the B-partition Q = {¬B} ∪ {Pn, n ∈ N} made of M := 1 + |N | cells (
so M ≥ 2). Define a,b, c ∈ XM by setting a := (a′, o), b := (b′, o) and c := (c′, o).
Finally, let ΦQ be the mapping constructed in Lemma A2.
Now, u is an ordinal utility function for xp, by Proposition A3. Thus, for all n ∈ N
and p ∈ Pn, formula (A12) implies that xn xp αPn(p) xp yn. Thus, axiom (Dom)
implies that
κxnPn Pn αPn Pn κynPn . (A14)
Given the defining properties of the mapping ΦQ, formula (A14) then implies that
ΦQ(a)Pn Pn αPn Pn ΦQ(c)Pn . (A15)
Since formula (A15) holds for every n ∈ N , Lemma A5 further yields
ΦQ(a)B B α B ΦQ(c)B. (A16)
Meanwhile, we have ΦQ(b)Pn ≈Pn κxPn for every n ∈ N . By iterative applications of
(Sep), we obtain ΦQ(b)B ≈B κxB. But by assumption α ≈B κxB. Thus, ΦQ(b)B ≈B α,
by transitivity. Formula (A16) then gives
ΦQ(a)B B ΦQ(b)B B ΦQ(c)B. (A17)
Moreover, by construction, we have ΦQ(a)Q ≈Q ΦQ(b)Q ≈Q ΦQ(c)Q ≈Q κoQ where
Q = ¬B. Given this fact and formula (A17), axiom (Sep) implies
ΦQ(a) S ΦQ(b) S ΦQ(c). (A18)
By the definition of Q in formula (A1) and its representation obtained in Proposition
A3, formula (A18) implies∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(an) + µ(Q) · u(o) ≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(bn) + µ(Q) · u(o)
≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(cn) + µ(Q) · u(o),
which, given the definition of a, b and c, reduces to the following formula
u =
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(xn) ≤ µ(B) · u(x) ≤
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · u(xn) = u.
This completes the proof of the claim. 3 Claim 3
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Finally, we obtain
|E˜B [u ◦ α]− µ(B) · u(x)| ≤
(a)
|u− u| ≤
(b)
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) · |u(yn)− u(xn)|
≤
(c)
 ·
∑
n∈N
µ(Pn) ≤
(d)
 · µ(B).
Here, (a) is by Claims 2 and 3, (b) is by the definition of u and u, (c) is inequality
(A12), because 1/N <  by definition, and (d) is because µ is a credence on B and P is
a B-partition of B. This argument works for all  > 0. Letting →0, we conclude that
E˜B[u ◦ α] = µ(B) · u(x). Last, since µ‘ has full support, we obtain EB[u ◦ α] = u(x). 2
Finally, we come to the proof of the main result.
Proof of Theorem 9.
SEU representation. Let u : X−→R be the normalized ex post utility function and
let µ be the credence with full support from Proposition A3. Let {EB}B∈B be the unique
µ-compatible conditional expectation system from Proposition A4.
For any B ∈ B and α, β ∈ A(B), axiom (CEq) yields x, y ∈ X such that α ≈B κxB and
β ≈B κyB. Then,(
α B β
)
⇐⇒
(
κxB B κyB
)
⇐
(∗)⇒
(
x xp y
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
u(x) ≥ u(y)
)
⇐
()⇒
(
EB[u ◦ α] ≥ EB[u ◦ β].
)
Here, (∗) is by axiom (Dom), (†) is because u is an ordinal utility function for xp by
Proposition A3, and () is by Proposition A6. This equivalence establishes the SEU
representation. It remains to show that the representation is unique and demonstrate
the necessity of the axioms.
Uniqueness. Let u, u′ : X−→R be two continuous and D-measurable functions, and let
E := {EB}R∈B and E′ := {E′B}R∈B be two conditional expectation systems. Let µ and µ′
be two credences on B with which E and E′ are respectively compatible. Suppose that
(u, µ) and (u′, µ′) are both SEU representations for the conditional preference structure
{B}B∈B. We must show that µ = µ′ and u is a positive affine transformation of u′.
Let E = {E1, . . . , EN} be a B-partition of S, with N ≥ 2 (such a partition exists
because B is nontrivial). For any x ∈ XN , Lemma A2 yields an act αx ∈ A such that
αxBn ≈Bn κxnEn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Then we have
ES [u ◦ αx] (∗)
N∑
n=1
µ(En) EEn [u ◦ αx]
(†)
N∑
n=1
µ(En)EEn [u ◦ κxnEn ] =
N∑
n=1
µ(En) u(xn). (A19)
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Here, (∗) is by equation (12), while (†) is by the SEU representation and the fact that
αxBn ≈Bn κxnBn for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Define E as in equation (A1). By equation (A19),
we have for any x,y ∈ XN(
x E y
)
⇐⇒
(
N∑
n=1
µ(En) u(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
µ(En) u(yn)
)
.
The SEU representation (u′, µ′) provides similarly the following representation: for any
x,y ∈ XN (
x E y
)
⇐⇒
(
N∑
n=1
µ′(En) u′(xn) ≥
N∑
n=1
µ′(En) u′(yn)
)
.
Now, by the uniqueness part of Proposition A3, we obtain that µ and µ′ are equal to
each other, and that u and u′ are positive affine transformation of each other.
Necessity of the axioms. Assume that {B}B∈B satisfies condition (Rch) and has an
SEU representation in the sense of Theorem 9 with respect to a continuous and D-
measurable utility function u and a credence µ with full support. Let E := {EB}B∈B be
the unique, strictly monotonic conditional expectation system defined by µ via Propo-
sition A4. Axiom (Dom) is a simple consequence of the strict monotonicity of each
expectation functional in E. Axiom (Sep) follows from the fact that E satisfies Equation
(12). The proofs of the other axioms are somewhat more involved.
Axiom (TC): Fix two disjoint subsets B1,B2 ∈ B, and let Q1 = ¬B1 and Q2 = ¬B2. Fix
x, y, v, w ∈ X . By contradiction, assume that (x B1; y)  (v B1; w) but (x B2; y) ≺ (v B2;
w). Then, since (x
B1
; y)  (v B1; w), there exist α, β ∈ A(Q1), an (x, α)-bet (xB1α) ∈ A,
a (y, β)-bet (yB1β) ∈ A, a (v, α)-bet (vB1α) ∈ A and a (w, β)-bet (wB1β) ∈ A such that
(xB1α) S (yB1β) while (vB1α) S (wB1β). We now show that u(x)−u(y) ≤ u(v)−u(w).
Indeed, first we have
µ(B1)
(
u(x)− u(y)
)
(∗) ES [u ◦ (xB1α)]− µ(Q1)EQ1 [u ◦ (xB1α)]− ES [u ◦ (yB1β)] + µ(Q1)EQ1 [u ◦ (yB1β)]
≤
(†)
µ(Q1)
(
EQ1 [u ◦ (yB1β)]− EQ1 [u ◦ (xB1α)]
)
. (A20)
Here, (∗) is by formula (B1) in the definition of bets, equation (12) and the SEU
representation. Meanwhile, (†) is because ES [u ◦ (xB1α)] ≤ ES [u ◦ (yB1β)] because
(xB1α) S (yB1β). Proceeding similarly for (vB1α) and (wB1β), we obtain
µ(B1)
(
u(v)− u(w)
)
≥ µ(Q1)
(
EQ1 [u ◦ (wB1β)]− EQ1 [u ◦ (vB1α)]
)
. (A21)
Meanwhile, by formula (B2) in the definition of bets and the SEU representation, we
have EQ1 [u◦ (xB1α)] = EQ1 [u◦ (vB1α)] and EQ1 [u◦ (yB1β)] = EQ1 [u◦ (wB1β)]. Combining
inequalities (A20) and (A21) and using the fact that µ has full support, we obtain
u(x)− u(y) ≤ u(v)− u(w). (A22)
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Now, since (x
B2
; y) ≺ (v B2; w), there exist γ, δ ∈ A(Q2), an (x, γ)-bet (xB2γ) ∈ A,
a (y, δ)-bet (yB2δ) ∈ A, a (v, γ)-bet (vB2γ) ∈ A and a (w, δ)-bet (wB2δ) ∈ A such that
(xB2γ) S (yB2δ) while (vB2γ) ≺S (wB2δ). Thus,
µ(B2)
(
u(x)− u(y)
)
≥
(∗)
µ(Q2)
(
EQ2 [u ◦ (yB2δ)]− EQ2 [u ◦ (xB2γ)]
)
(†) µ(Q2)
(
EQ2 [u ◦ (wB2δ)]− EQ2 [u ◦ (vB2γ)]
)
, (A23)
where (∗) is obtained like inequality (A20), while (†) is by formula (B2) in the definition
of bets and the SEU representation. Combining inequalities (A22) and (A23), we get
µ(B2)
(
u(v)− u(w)
)
≥ µ(Q2)
(
EQ2 [u ◦ (wB2δ)]− EQ2 [u ◦ (vB2γ)]
)
. (A24)
Finally, applying equation (12) and the SEU representation to inequality (A24), we
obtain (vB2γ) S (wB2δ). But this contradicts the fact that (vB2γ) ≺S (wB2δ) .
Axioms (C) and (M): Let x ∈ X . Let (x,→)xp := {y ∈ X ; y xp x} and let
(←, x)xp := {y ∈ X ; y ≺xp x}. To verify axiom (C), we must show that these sets
are open in X . To verify axiom (M), we must show that they are elements of D. To
verify both, let r := u(x), and observe that (x,→)xp = u−1(r,∞) and (←, x)xp =
u−1(−∞, r), because u is an ordinal utility representation for xp. Since u is continuous,
these preimage sets are open in X . Since u is D-measurable, these preimage sets are
elements of D.
Axiom (CEq): Let B ∈ B and let α ∈ A(B). Then α = α′B for some α′ ∈ A.
Claim 1: clos[α′(S)] has a xp-maximal element and a xp-minimal element.24
Proof. (By contradiction) Suppose clos[α′(S)] had no xp-maximal element. Thus, for
any x ∈ clos[α′(S)], there exists some y ∈ clos[α′(S)] with y xp x. In other words,
x ∈ (←, y)xp . Thus, the collection {(←, y)xp ; y ∈ clos[α′(S)]} is an open cover for
clos[α′(S)].
However, α′ ∈ Cb(S,X ), so its image α′(S) is relatively compact; hence clos[α′(S)]
is compact. Thus, this open cover has a finite subcover; in other words, there ex-
ists some y1, . . . , yN ∈ clos[α′(S)] such that clos[α′(S)] is covered by the collection
{(←, yn)xp}Nn=1. Now, let y := maxxp{y1, . . . , yN} (this maximum exists because the
set is finite). Then y ∈ clos[α′(S)], and (←, yn)xp ⊆ (←, y)xp for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ].
Thus, clos[α′(S)] ⊆ (←, y)xp . But clearly, y 6∈ (←, y)xp , whereas y ∈ clos[α′(S)].
Contradiction.
To avoid the contradiction, clos[α′(S)] must have a xp-maximal element. The proof
for xp-minimal elements is analogous. 3 Claim 1
24Actually, we only need to obtain an upper and lower bound for clos[α′(S)] in X . But constructing a
maximum and minimum is no more difficult.
48
Let x be a xp-minimal element of clos[α′(S)], and let z be a xp-maximal element of
clos[α′(S)]; these exist by Claim 1. Then x xp α(b) xp z for all b ∈ B. Thus, axiom
(Dom) implies that κxB B α B κzB. Thus,
u(x) = EB[u ◦ κxB] ≤
(∗)
EB[u ◦ α] ≤
(∗)
EB[u ◦ κzB] = u(z),
where both (∗) are because of the assumed SEU representation. However, u : X−→R
is continuous, and X is connected. Thus, the Intermediate Value Theorem yields some
y ∈ X such that u(y) = EB[u ◦ α]. Thus, EB[u ◦ κyB] = EB[u ◦ α]. But then the assumed
SEU representation yields κyB ≈B α, as desired.
Axiom (PC): Let D ∈ B and E ∈ B be disjoint, and let G := D ∨ E . Let O ⊆ A(G)
be open in the G-order topology, and let β ∈ O. Thus, there exist some α, γ ∈ A(G)
such that α ≺G β ≺G γ, and O contains the order-interval (α, γ)G . Let a := EG[u ◦ α],
b := EG[u ◦ β], and c := EG[u ◦ γ]; then a < b < c. Let  := min{b − a, c − b}. Then
 > 0.
Claim 2: There exist a subset OD ⊆ A(D), open in the D-order topology, such that
βD ∈ OD, and such that |ED[u ◦ ωD]− ED[u ◦ βD]| <  for all ωD ∈ OD.
Proof. (Case 1) First, suppose that βD is neither D-maximal nor D-minimal in
A(D). Then there exists some φD, ψD ∈ A(D) such that φD ≺D βD ≺D ψD. Now,
φD := φ′D and ψD := ψ
′
D for some φ, ψ ∈ A. Let w be a xp-minimal element of
clos[φ′(S)], and let z be a xp-maximal element of clos[ψ′(S)]; these exist by Claim 1.
Then w xp φD(d) and ψD(d) xp z for all d ∈ D. Thus,
κwD D φD ≺D βD ≺D ψD D κzD,
where the “D” comparisons are by axiom (Dom), and the “≺D” comparisons are by
the definitions of φD and ψD. Thus,
u(w) = ED[u ◦ κwD] <
(∗)
ED[u ◦ β] <
(∗)
ED[u ◦ κzD] = u(z),
where both (∗) are because of the assumed SEU representation. Thus, u(w) < ED[u ◦
β] < u(z). Now, u is continuous, and X is connected. Thus, the Intermediate Value
Theorem yields x, y ∈ X such that ED[u ◦ β] −  < u(x) < ED[u ◦ β] < u(y) <
ED[u ◦ β] + . (It is even possible that w and z themselves already satisfy these
inequalities). Thus,
ED[u ◦ κxD] = u(x) < ED[u ◦ β] < u(y) = ED[u ◦ κyD],
so κxD ≺D βD ≺D κyD, by the assumed SEU representation. Thus, if we define OD :=
(κxD, κ
y
D)D , then OD is open in the D-order topology, and βD ∈ OD. Furthermore,
for any ωD ∈ OD, we have κxD ≺D ωD ≺D κyD, and thus,
ED[u ◦ β]−  <
()
u(x) = ED[u ◦ κxD] <
(∗)
ED[u ◦ ωD]
<
(∗)
ED[u ◦ κyD] = u(y) <
()
ED[u ◦ β] + ,
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so that |ED[u ◦ωD]−ED[u ◦ βD]| < , as desired. Here, the (∗) inequalities are by the
assumed SEU representation, and () inequalities are by the definitions of x and y.
(Case 2) Suppose βD is D-maximal in A(D), but not D-minimal. The logic is
similar to Case 1, so we will be more cursory. There exists some φD ∈ A(D) such that
φD ≺D βD. As in Case 1, use Claim 1 to obtain some w ∈ X such that w xp φD(d)
for all d ∈ D. Thus, κwD D φD ≺D βD, and thus, u(w) = ED[u ◦ κwD] < ED[u ◦ β].
Now, u is continuous, and X is connected, so the Intermediate Value Theorem yields
x ∈ X such that ED[u◦β]− < u(x) < ED[u◦β]. Thus, ED[u◦κxD] = u(x) < ED[u◦β],
so κxD ≺D βD. Thus, if we define OD := (κxD,→)D , then OD is open in the D-order
topology, and βD ∈ OD; in fact, βD is a D-maximal element of OD. Thus, for any
ωD ∈ OD, we have κxD ≺D ωD D βD, and thus,
ED[u◦β]−  <
()
u(x) = ED[u◦κxD] <
(∗)
ED[u◦ωD] ≤
(∗)
ED[u◦β] < ED[u◦β] + ,
as desired. Here, the (∗) inequalities are by the assumed SEU representation, and the
() inequality is by the definition of x.
(Case 3) Suppose βD is D-minimal in A(D), but not D-maximal. The logic is
exactly the same as Case 2, but with all the preferences and inequalities reversed.
(Case 4) Suppose βD is both D-minimal and D-maximal in A(D). In this case,
ED[u ◦ ω] = ED[u ◦ β] for all ω ∈ A(D). Thus, if we define OD := A(D), then the
claim is trivially satisfied. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: There exist a subset OE ⊆ A(E), open in the E -order topology, such that
βE ∈ OE , and such that |EE [u ◦ ωE ]− EE [u ◦ βE ]| <  for all ωE ∈ OE .
Proof. The argument is identical to Claim 2. 3 Claim 3
Now let ω ∈ A(G), and suppose ωD ∈ OD and ωE ∈ OE . Then
µ[G]EG[u ◦ ω] (∗) µ[D]ED[u ◦ ω] + µ[E ]EE [u ◦ ω]
<
(†)
µ[D]
(
ED[u ◦ β] + 
)
+ µ[E ]
(
EE [u ◦ β] + 
)
(∗) µ[G] (EG[u ◦ β] + ) ≤
()
µ[G]EG[u ◦ γ].
Here, both (∗) are by equation (12), (†) is by the inequalities in Claims 2 and 3, and the
full support of µ while () is by the definition of . Thus, EG[u ◦ ω] < EG[u ◦ γ]. Thus,
by the presumed SEU representation ω ≺G γ. By an identical argument, EG[u ◦ ω] >
EG[u ◦ α], and thus, ω G α. Thus, ω ∈ (α, γ)G , and thus, ω ∈ O, as desired. 2
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B Proofs of results from Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8
The proofs in this appendix draw heavily on results from a companion paper, which stud-
ies credences and their representations by classical probability measures (Pivato and Ver-
gopoulos, 2017b). We will refer to results in the companion paper with the prefix “PV”.
Thus, “Theorem PV-4.3” should be read as, “Theorem 4.3 from Pivato and Vergopoulos
(2017b).”
Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4 are all obtained as corollaries of the following alternate version
of Theorem 9 in the particular case where B = R(S) and D = R(X ).
Theorem B1 Let S be a nondegenerate topological space, let X be a connected topological
space, and let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on
A which satisfies condition (Rch). Then, it further satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C), (Dom),
(Sep), (PC), and (TC) if and only if it has an SEU representation (u, µ), where u is a
continuous function and µ is a credence on R(S) with full support. Finally, µ is unique,
and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Proof of Theorem B1. In Theorem 9, the D-measurability of the utility function u only
serves to obtain axiom (M), and not the other axioms. To prove the necessity of the
axioms, we can therefore proceed here exactly as in Theorem 9. Conversely, in Theorem
9, axiom (M) only serves to obtain the D-measurability of u. (See Claim 6 in the proof
of Proposition A3.) This is only used to make sure that u ◦ α is B-comeasurable for
any α ∈ A. Here, since u and α are continuous, u ◦ α is also continuous, and therefore
automatically R(S)-measurable for any α ∈ A, by Proposition PV-5.4(a). Thus, we
do not need axiom (M) in showing the sufficiency of the axioms for the representation.
Finally, the uniqueness of the representation can be obtained exactly as in Theorem 9
since the argument invoked there uses neither axiom (M) nor D-measurability. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. “⇐=” Let ν be a residual charge on S with full support, and
u : X−→R be a continuous function that together provide an SEU representation of
{R}R∈R(S) as in equation (2). Let µ be the credence on R(S) obtained by restricting
ν to R(S) as in Example 6(b). As explained in Example 8(b), EµB[u ◦ α] =
∫
B u ◦ α dν;
thus, (u, µ) provides an SEU representation as in Theorem B1. Moreover, since ν has
full support, µ also has full support. Thus, {R}R∈R(S) must satisfy all of axioms (CEq),
(C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC) by Theorem B1.
“=⇒” If {R}R∈R(S) satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC) and (TC), then
Theorem B1 says it has an SEU representation given by a credence µ on R(S) with full
support, and a continuous utility function u : X−→R. Let E be the µ-compatible condi-
tional expectation structure from Proposition A4. Since S is a Baire space, Proposition
PV-6.1 yields a residual charge on S representing µ and E as in Examples 6(b) and 8(b).
Combining this and the credence SEU representation from Theorem B1, we obtain an
SEU representation as in formula (2). Since µ has full support, ν has also full support.
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Finally, suppose that both (u, ν) and (u′, ν ′) provide a representation of {R}R∈R. Let
µ and µ′ be the credences obtained by restricting respectively ν and ν ′ to R(S). Then,
by the assumed representations and Example 8(b), (u, µ) and (u′, µ′) both provide SEU
representations as in formula (13). By uniqueness in Theorem B1, u and u′ are positive
affine transformations of each other. Moreover, µ and µ′ are equal to each other. Thus,
Proposition PV-2.7 implies that ν = ν ′. 2
The proofs of Theorems C1, 2, 3 and 4 are very similar to the proof of Theorem 1, and we
only briefly sketch them. They require the following lemma.
Lemma B2 (a) Any nonsingleton Hausdorff space is nondegenerate.
(b) If S is a nondegenerate space, then R(S) is nontrivial.
(c) Suppose S is either locally compact or normal Hausdorff. For any nonempty open
O ⊆ S, there is a nonempty R ∈ R(S) with clos(R) ⊆ O.
Proof. (a) Since |S| ≥ 2, there exist s1, s2 ∈ S with s1 6= s2. Since S is Hausdorff, there
are disjoint open neighbourhoods O1,O2 ⊂ S around s1 and s2. Thus, O1 and O2 are
both nonempty open subsets which are not dense in S.
(b) Let O ⊂ S be a nonempty, non-dense open subset. Let C := S \ O. Then C is
a proper closed subset of S with a nonempty interior (because O is not dense). Let
R := int(C). Then ∅ 6= R 6= S, and R is regular, because it is the interior of a closed
set. Thus, R(S) is nontrivial.
(c) First suppose S is locally compact. Let s ∈ O. By local compactness, O contains
a compact subset K which is also a neighbourhood of s. Let R := int(K). Then
clos(R) ⊆ K ⊆ O, and R 6= ∅, because s ∈ R. Finally, R is regular, because it is the
interior of the closed set K.
Now suppose S is normal. If O = S, the statement is trivial. So assume O 6= S.
Let s ∈ O and let C := S \ O. Then C is closed, and {s} is also closed, because S
is Hausdorff. By normality, there exist disjoint open sets U1,U2 containing {s} and C.
Let K = clos(U1); the K is closed and disjoint from U2. Thus, K is disjoint from C, so
K ⊆ O. Let R := int(K). Then R is regular (being the interior of a closed set), R is
nonempty (it contains U1) and clos(R) ⊆ K ⊆ O. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma B2(a,b), R(S) is nontrivial. The sufficiency and necessity
of the axioms, as well as the uniqueness of the representation, are obtained as in Theorem
1, with equations (PV-6T) and (PV-6U) and Corollary PV-6.7 playing respectively the
same role as Example 6(b), Example 8(b) and Proposition PV-6.1. Finally, there is a
minor difference in the proof of the full support property of the probability measure in the
sufficiency of the axioms. Let µ be the credence on R(S) obtained by applying Theorem
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B1. Let E be the µ-compatible conditional expectation structure from Proposition A4.
Let ν be the Borel probability measure obtained by applying Corollary PV-6.7 to E.
Now, suppose ν[O] = 0 for some nonempty open subset O of S. By Lemma B2(c), there
exists a nonempty R ∈ R(S) such that clos(R) ⊆ O. Thus,
µ(R)
(a)
ν(R) +
∫
∂R
φR dν ≤
(b)
ν(R) + ν(∂R)
= ν(clos(R)) ≤
(c)
ν(O) = 0,
where (a) is by Corollary PV-6.7, (b) is by equation (3) and (c) is because clos(R) ⊆ O.
But this contradicts the fact that µ has full support. Thus, ν[O] > 0 for every nonempty
open subset O of S, so ν has full support. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. The sufficiency and necessity of the axioms, as well as the uniqueness
of the representation, are obtained as in Theorem 2, with equations (PV-7A) and (PV-
7b), Theorem PV-7.2, and Example PV-7.3(a) playing respectively the same role as
equations (PV-6T) and (PV-6U) and Corollary PV-6.7. However, in the sufficiency of
the axioms, the proof that the Borel probability measure ν˙ on S˙ has full support is
slightly different. Let µ be the credence on R(S) obtained from Theorem B1. Let E
be the µ-compatible conditional expectation structure from Proposition A4. Let ν˙ be
the Borel probability measure on S˙ obtained by applying Theorem PV-7.2 to E. Now,
suppose ν˙[O˙] = 0 for some nonempty open subset O˙ of S˙. Since S˙ is compact Hausdorff,
Lemma B2(c) gives a nonempty regular subset R˙ ∈ R(S˙) such that closS˙(R˙) ⊆ O˙.
Define R := R˙ ∩ S. By Lemma PV-7.4(a), R is a regular subset of S. By equation
(PV-7A), we have µ(R) = ν˙(R˙) + ∫
∂R˙ φ˙R˙ dν˙R˙. At this point, we can proceed as in
Theorem C1 to obtain µ(R) = 0, which contradicts the fact that µ has full support.
Hence the full support of ν˙. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is very similar to Theorem 3, but using Example PV-7.3(c)
instead of Example PV-7.3(a). 2
Proof of Theorem 10. Let S∗ be the Stone space of the Boolean algebra B —that is, the set
of all Boolean algebra homomorphisms from B into {T, F}. Let Clp(S∗) be the set of all
clopen subsets of S∗; this is a Boolean algebra under the standard set-theoretic operations
of union, intersection, and complementation. The Stone Representation Theorem says
there is a Boolean algebra isomorphism Φ : B−→Clp(S∗) given by Φ(B) = B∗ for all
B ∈ B, where B∗ := {s∗ ∈ S∗; s∗(B) = T}.
“⇐=” Suppose µ∗ is a Borel probability measure on S∗ with full support, and u :
X−→R is a continuous function that together provide a Stonean SEU representation
of {B}B∈B as in formula (14). For all B ∈ B, define µ[B] := µ∗[B∗]. In other words,
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µ := µ∗ ◦ Φ. Then µ is a credence on B, because Φ is a Boolean algebra isomorphism
from B to Clp(S∗), and µ∗ is a finitely additive probability measure when restricted
to Clp(S∗). Furthermore, Theorem PV-8.4 says that EµB[u ◦ α] =
∫
B∗ u ◦ α∗ dµ∗ for all
α ∈ A; thus, (u, µ) provides an SEU representation as in formula (13). Meanwhile, µ∗
has full support, so µ∗[B∗] > 0 for all B∗ ∈ Clp(S∗), and hence, µ[B] > 0 for all B ∈ B;
thus µ also has full support. Thus, Theorem 9 says that {B}B∈B satisfies the axioms
(CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC), (M) and (TC).
“=⇒” If {B}B∈B satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C), (Dom), (Sep), (PC), (M), and (TC),
then Theorem 9 says it has an SEU representation (13) given by a credence µ on B
with full support, and a continuous utility function u : X−→R. Let E be the µ-
compatible conditional expectation structure from Proposition A4. Define the func-
tion µ∗ : Clp(S∗)−→[0, 1] by setting µ∗(B∗) := µ[B] for all B ∈ B —in other words,
µ∗ := µ ◦ Φ−1. This is a finitely additive probability measure on Clp(S∗) because Φ−1
is a Boolean algebra isomorphism from Clp(S∗) to B. Theorem PV-8.4 says that µ∗
extends to a unique Borel probability measure µ∗ on S∗ such that, for any g ∈ GB(S)
and B ∈ B, we have EµB[g] =
∫
B∗ g
∗ dµ∗. In particular, for any α ∈ A, we have
EµB[u ◦ α] =
∫
B∗ u ◦ α∗ dµ∗ (because (u ◦ α)∗ = u ◦ α∗). Applying this identity to the
credence SEU representation (13), we obtain a Stonean SEU representation as in formula
(14).
Full support. µ[B] > 0 for every nonempty B ∈ B. Thus, µ∗[B∗] > 0 for every nonempty
B∗ ∈ Clp(S∗). But S∗ is totally disconnected, so Clp(S∗) is a base for the topology of
S∗. Thus, we deduce that µ∗[O∗] > 0 for every nonempty open subset O∗ ⊆ S∗.
Uniqueness. Suppose that both (u1, µ
∗
1) and (u2, µ
∗
2) provide Stonean SEU represen-
tation for {B}B∈B. Let µ1 := µ∗1 ◦ Φ and µ2 := µ∗2 ◦ Φ; these are credences on B,
and by Theorem PV-8.4, they both provide SEU representations as in formula (13). By
uniqueness in Theorem 9, u1 and u2 are positive affine transformations of each other,
while µ1 = µ2. Thus, the “uniqueness” part of Theorem PV-8.4 says that µ
∗
1 = µ
∗
2. 2
The next lemma is not needed to prove any of our results. But it justifies a claim made
at the end of Section 6, where we provided an interpretation of compactification SEU
representations. There, we claimed that, if S ∈ R(T ), then R(S) ⊆ R(T ). In fact, we will
prove a slightly stronger result.
Lemma B3 Let T be a topological space, and let S ⊆ T . Let R(S) denote the set of
regular subsets of S with respect to the subspace topology on S. If S ∈ R(T ), then R(S) =
{R ∈ R(T ); R ⊆ S}.
Proof. Let R ⊆ S. We must show that R ∈ R(S) if and only if R ∈ R(T ). First note that
closT (R) ⊆ closT (S), and thus,
intT [closT (R)] ⊆ intT [closT (S)] = S, (B1)
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where the last equality is because S ∈ R(T ). Let O(T ) be the family of open subsets of
T , and let O(S) be the family of relatively opens subsets of S. Then O(S) = {O ∈ O(T );
O ⊆ S}, because S itself is open in T .
Claim 1: Let O ⊆ T . Then(
O ∈ O(T ) and O ⊆ closT (R)
)
⇐⇒
(
O ∈ O(S) and O ⊆ closS(R)
)
.
Proof. “⇐=” is because O(S) ⊆ O(T ) and closS(R) ⊆ closT (R).
To see “=⇒”, suppose O ∈ O(T ) and O ⊆ closT (R). Then O ⊆ intT [closT (R)],
and thus, formula (B1) implies that O ⊆ S. Thus, O ∈ O(S) and O ⊆ S∩closT (R) =
closS(R). 3 Claim 1
We now have
intT [closT (R)] =
⋃
{O ∈ O(T ) ; O ⊆ closT (R)}
(∗)
⋃
{O ∈ O(S) ; O ⊆ closS(R)} = intS [closS(R)], (B2)
where (∗) is by Claim 1. Thus,(
R ∈ R(T )
)
⇐⇒
(
R = intT [closT (R)]
)
⇐
(†)⇒
(
R = intS [closS(R)]
)
⇐⇒
(
R ∈ R(S)
)
,
where (†) is by formula (B2). 2
C SEU representations on normal state spaces
Theorem 2 assumed that the state space S was a compact Hausdorff space. Theorem 4
extended this to locally compact Hausdorff spaces, but the resulting SEU representation
involved the Stone-Cˇech representation, which can be rather unwieldy. This appendix
presents a variant of Theorem 2 which works for any normal Hausdorff space, and requires
neither compactness nor local compactness.
Recall that a topological space S is Hausdorff if any pair of points in S can be placed
in two disjoint open neighbourhoods. A Hausdorff space S is normal (or “T4”) if, for any
disjoint closed subsets C1, C2 ⊂ S, there exist disjoint open sets O1,O2 ⊂ S with C1 ⊆ O1
and C2 ⊆ O2. For example, any subset of RN is normal. More generally, every metrizable
space is normal. In particular, every topological manifold is normal. Also, every compact
Hausdorff space is normal. Finally, the order topology on any strictly ordered set is both
Hausdorff and normal. (However, if I is an uncountably infinite set, then the topology
of pointwise convergence on RI is not normal.) Thus, almost all topological spaces which
would arise naturally in economic applications are normal.
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Charges and liminal charge structures. Let A(S) be the Boolean algebra generated
by the open subsets of S. Thus, A(S) contains all open subsets, all closed subsets, and all
finite unions and intersections of such sets. A function ν : A(S)−→[0, 1] is a charge if it
is finitely additive —i.e. ν[A unionsq B] = ν[A] + ν[B] for any disjoint A,B ∈ A(S). We say ν
is a probability charge if, furthermore, ν(S) = 1. Another charge ρ is absolutely continuous
relative to ν if ρ[B] = 0 whenever ν[B] = 0.
Let ν be a probability charge on A(S). For any B ∈ A(S), let νB be the restriction
of ν to a charge on the elements of A(B). A liminal charge structure subordinate to ν is
a collection {ρR}R∈R(S), where, for all R ∈ R(R), ρR is a charge on A(∂R) which is
absolutely continuous with respect to ν, such that, for any regular partition {R1, . . . ,RN}
of S, we have
ρR1 + · · ·+ ρRN = ν∂R1∪···∪∂RN . (C1)
As with the liminal density structures introduced in Section 5, the liminal charge structure
describes how the agent copes with her informational limitations; once she has “observed”
the eventR, the charge ρR describes how much probability she conditionally assigns to ∂R,
and how this probability is distributed. To be precise, for any U ∈ A(S), the conditional
probability she assigns to U , given that she has “observed” R, is the following ratio:
ν(U ∩R) + ρR(U ∩ ∂R)
ν(R) + ρR(∂R) . (C2)
A charge ν is normal if, for every B ∈ A(S), we have ν[B] = sup{ν[C]; C ⊆ B and C closed
in S} and ν[B] = inf{ν[O]; B ⊆ O ⊆ S and O open in S}. A liminal charge structure
{ρR}R∈R(S) is normal if ρR is a normal charge on ∂R for all R ∈ R(S). Finally, a charge
ν is said to have full support if ν(O) > 0 for any open set O in S.
Liminal charge SEU representation. Let X be another topological space, let A ⊆
Cb(S,X ), and let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on A. A liminal charge
SEU representation for {R}R∈R(S) is given by a charge ν on A(S), a liminal charge structure
{ρR}R∈R(S) subordinate to ν, and a continuous utility function u : X−→R, such that, for
all R ∈ R(S) and all α, β ∈ A(R),(
α R β
)
⇐⇒
(∫
R
u ◦ α dν +
∫
∂R
u ◦ α dρR ≥
∫
R
u ◦ β dν +
∫
∂R
u ◦ β dρR
)
. (C3)
In this representation, the value of an act conditional on a regular event R has two compo-
nents, which correspond to the two ways in whichR could be the outcome of an observation,
as explained above. If S is a normal Hausdorff space, then we have the following variant
of Theorem 2.
Theorem C1 Let S be a (nonsingleton) normal Hausdorff space, let X be a connected
space, and let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ). Let {R}R∈R(S) be a conditional preference structure on A
which satisfies condition (Rch). Then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies Axioms (CEq), (C), (Dom),
(Sep), (PC) and (TC) if and only if it admits a liminal charge SEU representation (C3),
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where ν is a normal probability charge on A(S) with full support, and {ρR}R∈R(S) is a
normal liminal charge structure. Furthermore, ν and {ρR}R∈R(S) are unique, and u is
unique up to positive affine transformation.
Proof of Theorem C1. The sufficiency and necessity of the axioms, as well as the uniqueness
of the representation, are obtained as in Theorem 2, with equations (PV-6D) and (PV-
6E) and Proposition PV-6.4 playing respectively the same role as equations (PV-6T)
and (PV-6U) and Corollary PV-6.7. The proof of full support is as in Theorem 2. 2
Theorem C1 is similar to Theorem 1 in that both represent the agent’s beliefs using finitely
additive charges. But Theorem C1 has two advantages over Theorem 1: the charge ν is
now normal, and the liminal structure explicitly encodes how the agent deals with the
limits of her observational technology.
D Necessary and sufficient conditions for (Rch)
In this appendix, we will show that condition (Rch) places an important restriction on the
utility function u. We say that a function u : X−→R is nonsatiating if, for any x ∈ X ,
there exist x, x ∈ X such that u(x) < u(x) < u(x). Equivalently: u never obtains a global
maximum or global minimum on X . (For example, this is the case if supx∈X u(x) =∞ and
infx∈X u(x) = −∞.) In particular, if u is continuous and nonsatiating, then X cannot be
compact. Our next result says that, if S and X satisfy certain conditions, then condition
(Rch) is more or less equivalent to a nonsatiating utility function. To state this result, we
need two topological preliminaries.
A topological space X is contractible if there is a function f : [0, 1]×X−→X and a point
z ∈ X such that f(0, x) = x for all x ∈ X , whereas f(1, x) = z for all x ∈ X . (In other
words: the identity map on X is null-homotopic.) Heuristically, this mean that X is not
only path-connected, but it has no “holes” of any dimension.25 For example, any convex
subset of RN is contractible. More generally, any star-shaped subset of any topological
vector space is contractible.26 However, there exist other, less obvious contractible spaces
(even contractible manifolds).
A topological space is extremally disconnected if the closure of every open set is open.
Clearly, these are rather exotic spaces: any extremally disconnected Hausdorff space is
totally disconnected, and any extremally disconnected metrizable space is discrete. It is
safe to say that most of the topological spaces which would arise in economic applications
are not extremally disconnected.
A credence µ is nonatomic if, for all R ∈ R(S), if 0 <  < µ[R], then there exists some
R′ ∈ R(S) with R′ ⊂ R and µ[R′] = .
Proposition D1 Let S and X be topological spaces, let A ⊆ Cb(S,X ), and let {R}R∈R(S)
be a conditional preference structure on A with an SEU representation given by a contin-
uous utility function u : X−→R and a credence µ with full support.
25To be precise: all the homotopy groups of X are trivial.
26A subset X of a topological vector space is star-shaped if r x ∈ X for all x ∈ X and all r ∈ [0, 1].
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(a) Suppose S is a normal Hausdorff space, X is contractible, and A = Cb(S,X ). If
u is nonsatiating and µ is nonatomic, then {R}R∈R(S) satisfies axiom (Rch).
(b) If S is not extremally disconnected, and {R}R∈R(S) satisfies axiom (Rch), then
u is nonsatiating.
(c) If S is extremally disconnected and A = Cb(S,X ), then {R}R∈R(S) always sat-
isfies axiom (Rch).
A first consequence of Proposition D1 is the following restriction on the primitive
topologies: if the state space is not extremally disconnected, then the outcome space
cannot be compact. (For most applications, this is only a mild loss of generality: let
X ′ be some large but non-compact subset of X where xp has neither a maximal nor a
minimal element, and let A′ be the set of elements in A which range over X ′; then we can
construct an SEU representation of the agent’s preferences on A′ instead.) Proposition D1
also provides a characterization of condition (Rch). For example, if S is any non-discrete
metric space (e.g. a non-discrete subset of RN) and X is a convex subset of RM , while
A = Cb(S,X ) and µ is nonatomic, then Proposition D1(a,b) implies that {R}R∈R(S)
satisfies (Rch) if and only if u is nonsatiating.
At the opposite extreme, the Stone space of complete Boolean algebra is extremally
disconnected (Fremlin, 2004, Theorem 314S). In particular, R(S) is a complete Boolean
algebra (Fremlin, 2004, Theorem 314P). Thus, if we apply the machinery from Section 8 in
the case B = R(S), then the resulting space S∗ is extremally disconnected, so Proposition
D1(c) says that any conditional preference structure on C(S∗,X ) satisfies (Rch).
The rest of this appendix is the the proof of Proposition D1. First, we need three
topological lemmas.
Lemma D2 Let S be any topological space. The interior of any closed subset of S is a
regular set.
Proof. Suppose C ⊆ S is closed. Let D := int(C). We want to show that D is regular.
Let C ′ := clos(D). Then C ′ ⊆ C. But D is (by definition) the largest open subset of C,
and since D ⊆ C ′ ⊆ C, that means that D is also the largest open subset of C ′ —hence
D = int(C ′), as desired. 2
Lemma D3 (S is extremally disconnected) ⇐⇒ (Every regular subset of S is clopen).
Proof. “=⇒” Let R be regular. Then R = int[clos(R)]. But clos(R) is open (because S is
extremally disconnected), so int[clos(R)] = clos(R). Thus, R = clos(R), so R is closed
—hence clopen.
“⇐=” Let O ⊆ S be open. Let R := int[clos(O)]; then R is a regular set (by
Lemma D2) which contains O (because it contains any open subset of clos(O)). But by
hypothesis, R is clopen. Thus, clos(R) = R. Thus, R is a closed set containing O, so
R ⊇ clos(O). But R = int[clos(O)], so R ⊆ clos(O). Thus, R = clos(O). So the closure
of O is open. 2
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Lemma D4 Suppose S is a normal Hausdorff space, and X is contractible. Let A :=
Cb(S,X ). Let R and Q be regular open subsets of S, such that clos(R) and clos(Q) are
disjoint. For any acts α, ξ0, and ξ1 in A, there is a bounded continuous function Γ :
[0, 1]× S−→X with the following properties:
(a) For all t ∈ [0, 1], we get a function γt ∈ A by setting γt(s) := Γ(t, s) for all s ∈ S.
(b) For all t ∈ [0, 1], γtR = αR.
(c) γ0Q = ξ
0
Q and γ
1
Q = ξ
1
Q.
(d) There is a compact subset K ⊆ X such that Γ(t, s) ∈ K for all t ∈ [0, 1] and
s ∈ S. Furthermore, the set K depends only on α, ξ0, and ξ1, and is independent of
the choice of Q and R.
(e) For any continuous function u : X−→R, and any T ∈ [0, 1], we have
lim
t→T
∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ = 0.
Given two acts α and ξ0, Lemma D4 says that we can construct an act γ0 which “inter-
polates” between them, in the sense that it agrees with α on R and agrees with ξ0 on Q.
Likewise, we can construct an act γ1 which agrees with α on R and agrees with ξ1 on Q.
Finally, we can continuously deform γ0 into γ1 via a continuously varying family of maps
{γt}t∈[0,1], such that every one of the functions γt agrees with α on R. In the jargon of
algebraic topology, the function Γ is a homotopy from γ0 to γ1 relative to R. Furthermore,
this relative homotopy can be constructed such that it never leaves some compact region
K, and when composed with any real-valued function u, the functions {u ◦ γt}t∈[0,1] trace
a continuous “path” through the space Cb(S,R) in the uniform norm topology.
Proof of Lemma D4. The space S is normal and Hausdorff, so it is Tychonoff (Willard,
2004, Corollary 15.7). So, let S be the Stone-Cˇech compactification of S, and let ι :
S ↪→ S be the canonical embedding. Let Kα := clos[α(S)], K0 := clos[ξ0(S)], and
K1 := clos[ξ1(S)]. These are compact subsets of X , because α, ξ0, and ξ1 are bounded
continuous functions. Let K∗ := Kα ∪ K0 ∪ K1; then K∗ is also compact, and α, ξ0,
and ξ1 are continuous functions from S into K∗. Thus, by the universal property of the
Stone-Cˇech compactification, we can extend them to continuous functions α, ξ
0
, and ξ
1
from S into K∗, such that α ◦ ι = α, ξ0 ◦ ι = ξ0, and ξ1 ◦ ι = ξ1 (Willard, 2004, Thm.
19.5; Aliprantis & Border, 2006, Thm. 2.79).
The space X is contractible, so there is a continuous function Ξ : [−1, 1]×S−→X such
that Ξ(−1, s) = α(s), Ξ(0, s) = ξ0(s) and Ξ(1, s) = ξ1(s) for all s ∈ S (Willard, 2004,
Theorem 32.7). Let K := Ξ ([−1, 1]× S). Then K is a compact subset of X , because
[−1, 1] × S is compact and Ξ is continuous. Note that the construction of K depends
only on α, ξ0 and ξ1; we have not yet refered to R and Q.
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Let Q := clos(Q) and R := clos(R); by hypotheses, these sets are disjoint. Since S
is normal, Urysohn’s Lemma yields a function φ : S−→[0, 1] such that φ(R) = {0} and
φ(Q) = {1} (Willard, 2004, Thm. 15.6; Aliprantis & Border, 2006, Thm. 2.46; Royden,
1988, Thm 8.7). Now define Γ : [0, 1]×S−→K by setting Γ(t, s) := Ξ[φ(s)·(t+1)−1, ι(s)],
for all t ∈ [0, 1] and all s ∈ S. Thus, Γ is a continuous function (because it is a
composition of continuous functions). Furthermore:
• For all t ∈ [0, 1], if we define the function γt : S−→X by setting γt(s) := Γ(t, s) for
all s ∈ S, then γt is continuous (because Γ is continuous) and bounded (because
its image is contained in the compact set K); thus, γt ∈ A.
• For all t ∈ [0, 1], and all r ∈ R, we have γt(r) = Γ(t, r) = Ξ[φ(r) · (t+ 1)−1, ι(r)] =
Ξ[0 · (t+ 1)− 1, ι(r)] = Ξ[−1, ι(r)] = α[ι(r)] = α(r). Thus, γtR = αR.
• For all q ∈ Q, we have γ0(q) = Γ(0, q) = Ξ[φ(q) ·(0+1)−1, ι(q)] = Ξ[1 ·1−1, ι(q)] =
Ξ[0, ι(q)] = ξ
0
[ι(q)] = ξ0(q). Thus, γ0Q = ξ
0
Q
• For all q ∈ Q, we have γ1(q) = Γ(1, q) = Ξ[φ(q) ·(1+1)−1, ι(q)] = Ξ[1 ·2−1, ι(q)] =
Ξ[1, ι(q)] = ξ
1
[ι(q)] = ξ1(t). Thus, γ1Q = ξ
1
Q.
Thus, Γ verifies all of properties (a)-(d).
To check property (e), let φ : S−→[0, 1] be the Stone-Cˇech extension of φ, and define
the function Γ : [0, 1]×S−→K by setting Γ(t, s) := Ξ[φ(s) · (t+1)−1, s], for all t ∈ [0, 1]
and all s ∈ S. For all t ∈ [0, 1], define the function γt : S−→K by setting γt(s) := Γ(t, s)
for all s ∈ S. Clearly, for all t ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ S, we have Γ(t, s) = Γ[t, ι(s)] and
hence u ◦ Γ(t, s) = u ◦ Γ[t, ι(s)]; in other words, u ◦ γt(s) = u ◦ γt[ι(s)]. Thus, for any
t, T ∈ [0, 1], ∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞. Thus, it suffices to show that
lim
t→T
∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ = 0.
To see this, let  > 0. Since u ◦ Γ is continuous, for every s ∈ S, there is some
δs > 0 and some open neighbourhood Zs around s in S such that, if we define Os :=
(T−δs, T+δs)×Zs (an open neighbourhood of (T, s)), then |u◦Γ(t, z)−u◦Γ(T, s)| < /2
for all (t, z) ∈ Os. The collection {Os}s∈S is an open cover of the set {T} × S. But
{T} × S is compact (because {T} and S are compact). Thus, this collection has a
finite subcover, say, {Osn}Nn=1 for some finite collection {sn}Nn=1 of points in S. Let
δ := min{δsn}Nn=1.
Claim 1: Suppose |t− T | < δ. Then |u ◦ Γ(t, z)− u ◦ Γ(T, z)| < , for all z ∈ S.
Proof. Let z ∈ S. Since {Osn}Nn=1 is an open cover of {T}×S, there is some n ∈ [1 . . . N ]
such that (T, z) ∈ Osn , which means that z ∈ Zsn . Since |t− T | < δ ≤ δsn , it follows
that (t, z) ∈ Osn also. Thus,
|u ◦ Γ(t, z)− u ◦ Γ(T, z)| ≤
(4)
|u ◦ Γ(t, z)− u ◦ Γ(T, sn)|+ |u ◦ Γ(T, sn)− u ◦ Γ(T, z)|
≤
(†)

2
+

2
= ,
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as desired. Here (4) is the triangle inequality, and (†) is two applications of the
defining property of Osn . 3 Claim 1
Since Claim 1 holds for all y ∈ S, we conclude that ∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ < . We can
construct such a δ for any  > 0. We conclude that lim
t→T
∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ = 0. 2
Proof of Proposition D1. (a) Suppose u is nonsatiating. Let R1,R2 ⊆ S, let α1 ∈ A(R1),
and let α2 ∈ A(R2). We must find β ∈ A(R2) compatible with α1 such that β ≈R2 α2.
Claim 1: Let E := ER2 [u ◦ α2]. There exist some some x0, x1 ∈ X such that
u(x0) < E < u(x1).
Proof. (by contradiction) Suppose there was no x0 ∈ X such that u(x0) < E. Thus,
u(x) ≥ E for all x ∈ X . In particular, this means that u ◦ α(r) ≥ E for all r ∈ R.
There are now two cases.
Case 1. If u ◦ α(r) = E for some r ∈ R, then there exists x ∈ X such that
u(x) = E, but by hypothesis, there does not exist any x ∈ X such that u(x) < E.
Thus, u obtains a minimal value of E at x, which contradicts the hypothesis that u is
nonsatiating.
Case 2. Proposition A4 says that ER is strictly monotonic, because µ has full
support. Thus, if u ◦α(r) > E for all r ∈ R, then ER[u ◦α] > E. But this contradicts
the definition of E.
Either way, we have a contradiction. To avoid this, there must be some x0 ∈ X with
u(x0) < E. An identical argument yields some x1 ∈ X with u(x1) > E. 3 Claim 1
Let Q be a closed subset of R2 with nonempty interior. Since it is a subset of the open
set R2, it is disjoint from the closed set clos(R1). Let Q := int(Q). This is a nonempty
regular subset of R2.
By definition of A(R1), there is some function α1 ∈ A such that α1 := α1R1 . Let
x0 and x1 be the values identified by Claim 1, and let ξ
0, ξ1 : S−→X be the constant
functions with value x0 and x1, respectively. Applying Lemma D4 to α1, ξ0 and ξ1, we
obtain a continuous function Γ : [0, 1]× S−→X with the following properties:
• For all t ∈ [0, 1], we get a function γt ∈ A by setting γt(s) := Γ(t, s) for all s ∈ S.
• For all t ∈ [0, 1], we have γtR1 = α1; thus, γtR2 is compatible with α1.
• γ0(q) = x0 and γ1(q) = x1 for all q ∈ Q.
Furthermore, there is a compact subset K ⊆ X such that Γ(t, s) ∈ K for all t ∈ [0, 1]
and s ∈ S. This set depends only on α1, x0, and x1, and is independent of the choice of
Q. Let M := max{|u(k)|; k ∈ K}; this maximum is well-defined because the function
|u| is continuous and K is compact. Let  := 1
2
min{|E− u(x0)|, |E− u(x1)|}; then  > 0
by Claim 1. Let Qc := R2 ∩ (¬Q). Since µ is nonatomic, we can make Q big enough
that µ[Qc] ≤  µ[R2]/M .
61
Finally, define v(t) := ER2 [u◦γtR2 ] for all t ∈ [0, 1]; this yields a function v : [0, 1]−→R.
Claim 2: v(0) < E < v(1).
Proof. µ[R2] · ER2 [u ◦ γ0R2 ] (∗) µ[Q] · EQ[u ◦ γ0Q] + µ[Qc] · EQc [u ◦ γ0Qc ]
≤
(†)
µ[Q] · u(x0) + µ[Qc] ·M
≤ µ[R2] · u(x0) +M ·  µ[R2]/M
= µ[R2] · u(x0) +  · µ[R2] = µ[R2] · (u(x0) + ).
Here, (∗) is by equation (12), because R2 = Q ∨Qc. Next, (†) is because γ0(q) = x0
for all q ∈ Q, while u(x) ≤M for all x ∈ X .
Dividing both sides by µ[R2], we get v(0) = ER2 [u◦γ0R2 ] ≤ u(x0)+ < E. Through
an identical proof, we establish that v(1) = ER2 [u ◦ γ1R2 ] ≥ u(x1)−  > E. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: v : [0, 1]−→R is a continuous function.
Proof. Fix T ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma D4(e) says that lim
t→T
∥∥u ◦ γt − u ◦ γT∥∥∞ = 0. A for-
tiori, lim
t→T
∥∥u ◦ γtR2 − u ◦ γTR2∥∥∞ = 0. Thus, limt→T ∣∣ER2 [u ◦ γtR2 ]− ER2 [u ◦ γTR2 ]∣∣ = 0
(because ‖ER2‖∞ = 1). In other words, limt→T |v(t) − v(T )| = 0, meaning that v is
continuous at T . This argument works for all T ∈ [0, 1]. 3 Claim 3
Combining the Intermediate Value Theorem with Claims 2 and 3, we obtain some t ∈
[0, 1] such that ER2 [u ◦ γtR2 ] = E. But then since (u, µ) is an SEU representation for{R}R∈R(S), we conclude that γtR2 ≈R2 α2. We have already observed that γtR2 is
compatible with α1. Thus, set β := γ
t
R2 to prove the theorem.
(b) By contradiction, suppose u was satiating. In particular, suppose u had a global
maximizer x ∈ X . (The argument for a global minimizer is analogous).
Since S is not extremally disconnected, Lemma D3 says there is someR ∈ R(S) which
is not a clopen set. (It follows that ∅ 6= R 6= S.) Let Q = ¬R; then Q ∈ R(S) also.
Let o ∈ X be such that u(o) < u(x). Without loss of generality, suppose u(o) = 0 and
u(x) = 1. Let κx be the constant x-valued act, and let κo be the constant o-valued act;
by hypotheses, both of these are elements of A. Structural condition (Rch) says that we
can find some αxR ∈ A such that (αxR)R ≈R κxR, while (αxR)Q = κoQ.
Claim 4: O1 := (u ◦ αxR)−1(0, 12) is a nonempty open subset of R.
Proof. O1 is the preimage of the open set (0, 12) under the continuous function u ◦ αxR,
so O1 is open. Furthermore, u ◦ αxR(q) = u(o) = 0 for all q ∈ Q. Thus, by continuity,
u ◦ αxR(s) = 0 for all s ∈ clos(Q) = S \ R. Thus, if O1 is nonempty, it must be a
subset of R. It remains to show that O1 is nonempty.
Now, R is not closed (by construction), so there exists a net {rλ}λ∈Λ (for some
directed set Λ) which converges to some point s ∈ S \ R. Thus, since u ◦ αxR is
continuous, we have limλ∈Λ u ◦ αxR(rλ) = u(s) = 0. In particular, this means that
rλ ∈ O1 for some λ ∈ Λ. Thus, O1 6= ∅. 3 Claim 4
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Now, let P1 := int[clos(O1)]; then P1 is a regular subset of R (by Lemma D2) which is
nonempty by Claim 4 (because it contains O1). Furthermore, 0 ≤ u ◦ αxR(p) ≤ 1/2 for
all p ∈ P1. Let P2 := R∩ (¬P1), then {P1,P2} is a regular partition of R, so that
µ[R]ER[u ◦ αxR] (∗) µ[P1]EP1 [u ◦ αxR] + µ[P2]EP2 [u ◦ αxR] ≤
(†)
1
2
· µ[P1] + 1 · µ[P2]
<
()
µ[P1] + µ[P2] = µ[R] (‡) µ[R]ER[u ◦ κx]. (D1)
Here, (∗) is by equation (12), while (†) is by the monotonicity of the expectation operator
ER, because (u ◦ αxR)(p) ≤ 12 for all p ∈ P1, while (u ◦ αxR)(p) ≤ u(x) = 1 for all p ∈ P2.
Next () is because µ[P1] > 0, because µ has full support. Finally, (‡) is because for all
r ∈ R, we have κx(r) = x, and thus, u ◦ κx(r) = u(x) = 1.
Dividing both sides of inequality (D1) by µ[R], we obtain:
ER[u ◦ αxR] < ER[u ◦ κx].
Thus, by the assumed SEU representation, we get αxR ≺R κxR. But this contradicts the
definition of αxR. To avoid the contradiction, x cannot be a global maximizer for u.
(c) Fix two disjoint regular subsets R1,R2 ∈ R(S), and two acts α1 ∈ A(R1) and
α2 ∈ A(R2). There exist α˜1 ∈ A and α˜2 ∈ A such that α1 = α˜1R1 and α2 = α˜2R2 .
Define β ∈ A by β(s) = α˜2(s) if s ∈ R2 and β(s) = α˜1(s) otherwise.
Let us show that β ∈ A. For any open subset V of X , we have by construction
that β−1(V) = (R2 ∩ α˜−12 (V)) ∪ (R{2 ∩ α˜−11 (V)). Now, S is extremally disconnected, so
Lemma D3 says that R2 is clopen. Thus, R{2 is open, so R{2 = ¬R2. Thus, β−1(V) =
(R2∩ α˜−12 (V))∪ (¬R2∩ α˜−11 (V)). Since α˜1 and α˜2 are both continuous, and R2 and ¬R2
are both open, we finally obtain that β−1(V) is open in S. Hence the continuity of β.
To see that β is also bounded, note that β(S) = (R2∩ α˜2(S))∪ (R{2∩ α˜1(S)). Therefore,
β(S) ⊆ clos(α˜1(S)) ∪ clos(α˜2(S)) and thus clos(β(S)) ⊆ clos(α˜1(S)) ∪ clos(α˜2(S)). By
assumption, each of α˜1 and α˜2 is bounded, and both clos(α˜1(S)) and clos(α˜2(S)) are
compact. Then, clos(α˜1(S)) ∪ clos(α˜2(S)) is also compact. Finally, clos(β(S)) is closed
in a compact set and, therefore, compact. Hence boundedness. So β ∈ Cb(S,X ) = A.
Now, since βR1 = α˜1R1 = α1 and βR2 = α˜1R2 = α2, we have that α1 and α2 are
compatible. Last, we naturally have α2 ≈R2 α2, which completes the proof of (Rch). 2
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